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ABSTRACT
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
The ImpllcatlonB of resale price maintenance for the 
public Interest continue to be Interpreted differently by 
economists and businessmen. As a result of the investigation 
of the HaeQuarrie Committee in 1951, resale price maintenance 
was banned unconditionally in Canada in the same year but 
recently a retrenchment of the position occurred with the 
amending of the Combines Investigation Act in I960.
An examination of the history of the practice within 
modern retailing in the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Canada reveals a difference in the legal approach by the govern* 
ments concerned. The more common arguments advanced in support 
of resÊleoprlce maintenance fail in their objective when exam­
ined in relation to the benefits accruing to the consumer.
The most prevalent aspect of these arguments, ^loss-leader" 
competition, appears as an indeterminate concept because of 
the inability of both economists and businessmen to arrive at 
an acceptable definition. Nevertheless these sane arguments 
give some Insight into the motives of retailers, wholesalers 
and manufacturers for desiring the use of resale price mainten­
ance. These motives evolve from the desire to either increase
or protect present profits. Retailers who support the practice
li
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admittedly desire protection from price competition but their 
reasons for entitlement to such protection fail to Indicate 
any benefits for the consumer, Manufacturers claim many 
damaging aspects resulting from the use of their product as a 
"loss-leader”, none of which are clearly substantiated. It 
appears that it is their profit margin which is damaged.
Resale price maintenance appears as detrimental to the 
public interest. It creates a favourable climate for price 
agreements at the various distributive levels. The consumer 
is forced to pay a higher price than might otherwise have been 
required if price competition were present. In addition he is 
made to pay for services which he may not desire end at the 
same time is denied his right to influence the distribution 
system thus retarding change in the structure of distribution. 
As a result inefficient uses of resources occur both in distri­
bution and in manufacturing.
ill
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PREFACE
Combine laws designed to protect the public from mono­
polistic and restrictive practices exist in the greater major­
ity of the countries of the western world. Because of the 
dynamic quality of modern economic development the need exists 
to fre(piently reexamine the relevance of such legislation to 
the rapidly changing econttnic conditions.
Resale price maintenance is one topic relating to combine 
law which has received increasing attention during recent times 
in both North America and Western Europe. There is no complet­
ely settled position on the practice although a tendency in 
one direction is spearing.
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the issues in­
volved and to present a conclusion as to the position of the 
practice.
In acknowledging my indebtedness to the members of my 
thesis committee I wish particularly to thank the Chairman, 
Professor W. J« Cillen for his patience and encouragement,
I am also grateful to Dr. W. G, Phillips and Dr. C, M, Birch 
for their direction and timely suggestions.
To the staff of the University Library I owe a large debt 
of gratitude for the cheerful way in which they filled my 
every request for assistance.
iv
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Resale price maintenance is the term used to identify a 
situation where a particular article la being resold by re­
tailers, wholesalers or other distributors at either a fixed 
price or at not less than a specified price.
The particular price may result from either of two 
methods of agreement, horizontal or individual. Horizontal 
resale price maintenance exists where rival wholesalers or 
manufacturers collectively agree on the resale price. This 
type of price fixing agreement is generally recognized as 
being against the public interest and will not be discussed 
in this paper.
Individual resale price maintenance results when an in­
dividual supplier specifies a minimum or fixed price at which 
a particular article is to be resold. The manufacturer may 
state the price at which all wholesalers will resell his pro­
duct or a wholesaler may specify the price at which retailers
will resell a certain article. In other instances an individ­
ual manufacturer may specify the prices at both the wholesale 
and retail level. The arguments submitted herein will apply 
to any of these arrangements.
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2
Individual resale price maintenance is associated pri­
marily with branded or trade marked products, "The purpose 
of branding is to emphasize a distinction between a particu­
lar article or class of articles and all other articles not 
marked in the same way; it becomes effective when the public 
Is aware of this distinction",^ The manufacturer of a bran­
ded or trade marked product is in a position to undertake 
national advertising stressing real or alleged differences 
between his product and other comparable products with the 
objective of creating a demand for it.
Enforcement of individual resale price policies will be 
determined by existing legislation, "Where the legislation 
permits, suppliers may require distributors to sign contracts 
agreeing to resell the product concerned at the indicated 
price. In some cases mere notifiction of the resale price 
may be sufficient or the signing of a contract by one dis­
tributor may automatically bind all other distributors.
Under such arrangements the supplier is then in a position to 
take legal action against any distributors who do not resell 
at the stated price.
Where legislation does not allow the supplier recourse 
to legal action the opportunity may exist to attempt
1 Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance 
Lloyd Jacob Committee (London, 1949) p. 3,
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enforcement of resale price maintenance by withholding sup­
plies from distributors who resell below the stated resale
price.2
With a policy of resale price maintenance the resale 
price may be established as a minimum price below which the 
article is not to be sold or it may be established as a fixed 
price at which the article is to be sold. The result will 
tend to be the same in either case. With a minimum resale 
price the distributor will be inclined to sell at this price 
as a result of competitive factors. The more general ten­
dency appears to be to specify fixed prices.
In the examination of the practice of resale price main­
tenance the various stages of economic activity which connect 
the producer with the consumer become involved. Whereas tra­
ditional economic theory is concerned mainly with a single 
product situation involving manufacturing or agriculture.
2 "In 1926 the Owl drug chain operating on the Pacific 
Coast defied the established policy of E, R. Squibb & dompany 
by announcing that it would sell Squibb's products at cut 
prices. This announcement precipitated a fight in which the 
Squibb Company was alleged to have arranged with druggists 
operating in the affected area to have them sell at cut prices, 
but at margins equivalent to those formerly enjoyed. This 
action, coupled with Squibb's refusal to sell to the Owl chain, 
brought the latter to terms in early 1927". An excellent ex­
ample of the possible action that may be open to manufacturers. 
E. R. A. Seligraan and R. A, Love. Price Cutting and Price 
Maintenance (New York, 1932) p. 39,
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4retailing, on the other hand, presents a different combina­
tion of factors which usually result in a multiple product 
firm. In addition the merging of the various stages of the 
distributive system is not generally covered in traditional 
theory,
The lack of any theoretical framework which can be di­
rectly applied to resale price maintenance presents two al­
ternatives in the method of approach to the topic. One pos­
sibility Involves the searching out of theoretical articles 
which are applicable and from these attempt to establish a 
model which fits resale price maintenance. The second choice 
consists of a more Inductive approach in which arguments are 
examined and motives questioned in an effort to determine the 
economic consequences of the practice and to derive an assess­
ment of its Implications for the public interest.
The latter method has been chosen along with the result­
ing limitations to the scope of this discussion. As a con­
sequence this thesis cannot answer all questions relating to 
combines* law.
It is accepted that in general economists have a bias 
toward price competition but at the same time reserve the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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right to make exceptions where the situation warrants it.3 
As this is in keeping with traditional theory it Is therefore 
accepted as given the principle that restrictions on competi­
tion, price as well as otherstypes, are presumed against the 
public interest unless proved otherwise. Consequently the 
reader will undoubtedly detect a bias toward price competition 
In the arguments which follow.
Resale price maintenance io said to have been in exis­
tence as far back as 200 B.C. but this discussion is concerned 
with its more recent history dating from the latter part of 
the nineteenth century and more particularly the developments 
since the end of World War II,
In Chapter II the development of the practice within the 
structure of modern retailing Is examined with reference to 
the United (dngdom, the United States and Canada, % e  varied 
reception of the practice by the governments of the three 
countries la then outlined from the early twentieth century 
up to the present date.
In attempting to establish the thesis that resale price 
maintenance is detrimental to the public Interest it becomes 
necessary to first examine the more common arguments presents*
3 Tlie existence of the argument against too perfect com­
petition and its inhibiting effects on economic change aa 
expressed by J, A, Schumpeter and others is acknowledged.
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6in support of the practice* Chapter III is devoted to such 
an examination with a rebuttal extended to each argument 
considered,
In the next chapter particular attention la focused on 
the "loss-leader" argument which is an inherent part of the 
major arguments rendered in support of resale price mainten­
ance. The attempt is made to examine and analyse all aspects 
of "loss-leader" competition in arriving at a conclusion as 
to the strength and validity of the argument.
Chapter V consists of an endeavour to gain an insight 
into the underlying motives which may lead distributors to 
support resale price maintenance followed by a discussion of 
the possible economic effects that the practice may tend to 
have on the distribution system of the economy.
The more recent development of strong support and in 
some cases aggressive leadership originating with manufactur­
ers requires a subsequent questioning of the possible motives 
behind these actions and it is to this which Chapter VI Is 
assigned along with the resulting economic Implications*
In conclusion the relevant points are examined in refer­
ence to their effect upon the consumer and upon economic effl<- 
ciency* An effort is made to summarize the specific points 
which support and illustrate the detrimental nature of resale 
price maintenance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
ORIGINS AND RECENT HISTORY 
UNITED KINODOM. UNITED STATES AND CANADA
The movement to foster the more widespread use of resale 
price maintenance appears to have gained significant impetus 
during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The 
growing price competition In many branches of retailing pro­
vided the motivating force for the movement.
New types of retailing establishments were rapidly cut­
ting into the trade of the small retailer. Department and 
chain stores, through their trading advantage, were able to 
offer the pablic numerous and significant price reductions, 
an attraction to which large sections of the public responded.
The competition provided by new methods of 
retailing was superimposed uptm probably more 
leisurely ccxnpetition that existed among the typ­
ical small-scale retailer of an earlier period.
The so-called 'legitimate* retailers (operating on 
a small or medium scale along traditional lines) 
felt the severe effects of the enhanced competition.
The smaller share of the trade that remained for 
them had to ba transacted at lower prices and mar­
gins of profit*^
The branding or trade-marking of merchandise became much 
more prevalent during this period contributing to the severity
of retail competition. By advertising, manufacturers of
1 B, S, Yamey "The Origins of Resale Price Maintenance; 
A Study of Three Branches of Retail Trade", Economic Journal 
LXII, p. 524.
7
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branded goods gained acceptance of their products by consumers 
and this preselling contributed to minimizing the need for 
specialized knowledge in retail selling. With the branded or 
trade marked products relatively easy to handle the large- 
scale retailers could now use unskilled labour for the now 
simplified function of selling. The entry of new firms into 
retailing was also made easier because of the reduced requir­
ement for specialised knowledge. Branding also led to compe­
tition across product lines. Grocers could now sell tobacco 
products or patent medicines, since no specialized knowledge 
of the merchandise was necessary to sell the branded goods of 
other trades. Consequently the different retail trades began 
to compete with each other.
The small and medium sized retailers operating along 
traditional lines of specialization were hardest hit by this, 
competition and ware forced to seek out methods to improve 
their competitive position. Some groups of small retailers 
combined their purchases to secure the better terms which 
their bulk-buying rivals enjoyed. Others joined together to 
form trade organizations with one of the major objectives^ 
being to negotiate with manufacturers In an effort to persuade 
them to adopt resale price maintenance.
2 Ibid.. p. 523.
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9Professor Yataey^  reveals that the great majority of manu­
facturers In the United Klngdoc* during the last decade of the 
nineteenth century were reluctant to adopt resale price main­
tenance. They did not appear to believe that uniform retail 
prices for a brand would be of any advantage to them. Price 
maintenance, at best, was regarded as an unfortunate restric­
tion sometimes necessary in order to placate influential 
sections of the retail trade.
Demands for maintained prices forced a difficult decision 
upon the manufacturer. Since not all retailers were in favour 
of price maintenance the manufacturer was faced with an assess­
ment of the relative strength of the two broad groups of sup­
portera and opponents. In addition he had to judge the extent 
of the damage which each group was likely to inflict upon him 
if dissatisfied with his decision.
If frustrated by its introduction, the opponents of re­
sale price maintenance would have a strong Incentive to In­
crease the sales of substitute brands. The larger firms could 
be moved to undertake production of competitive private brands 
and would be able to advertise extensively. Conversely sup­
porters of price maintenance could indicate their dissatisfac­
tion with non-protected goods by endeavouring to substitute 
other brands and by being uncooperative with manufacturers in
3 Ibid., p. 540,
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their sales and promotion efforts and by keeping their lines 
poorly displayed or hidden from view. Associations of suppor­
ting retailers could sponsor the production of brands to be 
distributed solely by members, The London and District Tobac­
conists Association introduced a selection of its own branded 
pocket tobaccos in 1892, and the Birmingham Association mar­
keted Its own brands in 1895*^
The retail trade associations used various arguments in 
their attempts to persuade manufacturers to adopt resale price 
maintenance. They consisted of a mixture of offers of friend­
ship and support at one extreme through to threats of absolute 
boycott at the other. The amount of progress in overcoming 
the objections of the manufacturers depended to a great ex­
tent upon the strength of the retail organization. Tlie strong­
est and most effective resistance came from producers of well 
established brands. The strongest and moat persistent pres­
sure from the retail trade originated with druggists.
The efforts to establish resale price maintenance in 
modern retailing originated in the period covering the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of 
the twentieth century. The movement was a result of the efforts 
of the independent small retailer to protect his profits from
4 Ibid.. p. 533.
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the danger which aggressive firms and their successful price 
policies presented. The movement originated with the retail 
trade and the majority of manufacturers who adopted the prac­
tice did 30 reluctantly in the beginning.
Prom this period resale price maintenance met with dif­
ferent attitudes on the part of the governments in the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Canada as revealed in part by 
the existence of or the lack of relevant legislation.
United Kingdom 
It is only during the last two decades that the United 
Kingdom has enacted legislation aimed at the control of com­
bines and restrictive practices. Prior to the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Practices Act of 1948 the United Kingdom had con­
ducted public enquiries into the problems of resale price 
maintenance on several occasions,
A sub committee of the Standing-Committee on Trusts con­
ducted the first enquiry in 1920. The majority of the commit­
tee found that resale price maintenance generally was to the 
advantage of the public, provided the maintained prices were 
fair and reasonable. To ensure this overriding provision, 
the committee recommended that resale price maintenance, to­
gether with other forms of restrictive business practices, 
should be subject to supervision by a tribunal which could 
investigate specific complaints of excessive charges and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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would be empowered to take or recommend such action as neces­
sary to correct the situation.
In 1930, another public inquiry, which also covered 
other restrictive business practices than resale price main­
tenance, was carried out by the Committee on Restraint of 
Trade, Although the committee viewed price maintenance as 
not free from disadvantage to the public, it was not satisfied 
that the public interest would be better served through a 
change in the existing law.
The Lloyd Jacob Committee was appointed in 1947to investi­
gate the practice of resale price maintenance. In its report 
rendered in 1949a the committee recommended no prohibition of 
individual resale price maintenance. But it also concluded 
that:
It appears to us to be contrary to the public 
interest for a manufacturer to use his power to cut 
off supplies in such a way as to obstruct the 
growth of particular methods of trading, to impede 
the distribution by another manufacturer of com­
petitive goods or to deprive the public of the 
benefits of low cost systems of distribution,^
The recommendation for not banning the practice was based
on the premise that it protected manufacturers of branded
goods from the harmful effects of so-called "loss-leader"
competition among resellers. The committee further recommended
5 Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance, 
(Lloyd jiacob Committee) (London, 1949) p. 23.
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that the appropriate Government Departments discuss with the 
principal national organizations in trade and industry the . 
most satisfactory means of removing the undesirable results 
of individual resale price maintenance. In addition it was 
recommended that collective resale price maintenance be made 
Illegal.
As a result of the failure to resolve the undesirable 
effects of the practice, the Government issued a White paper 
in June 1951 announcing its intention of introducing legisla­
tion to make individual as well as collective resale price 
maintenance illegal. The legislation had not been introduced 
when a new government took office in November, 1951.
In December 1952, this government asked the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Practices Commission to conduct an inquiry 
into certain widely prevalent restrictive practices. The 
committee report was presented in 1955 and as a result the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 was passed.
The collective enforcement of resale prices was made 
Illegal but manufacturers were now able to enforce individual 
resale contracts not only in the case of dealers who had signed 
a contract but also in the case of a person who acquires the 
goods with a notice of the resale price conditions.
Between I960 and 1964 The Monopolies Commission conclu­
ded in two out of three reports on resale price maintenance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In particular Industries that the practice was against the 
public interest and should be terminated.
In July of 1964, the Government passed the Resale Prices 
Act making resale price maintenance illegal effective April 
30J 1965. Suppliers of goods were allowed to apply for ex­
emption from the statutory prohibition of resale price main­
tenance from August 15, 1964 to November 15, 1964. Until a 
decision is rendered by the Restrictive Trade Practices Court 
the suppliers in question can continue with resale price main­
tenance, Suppliers applying after November 15, 1964 will 
have to await a favourable decision before commencing price 
maintenance.
The Act specifies that the Court may exempt a class of 
goods if it appears to the Court that in default of a system 
of maintained minimum resale prices applicable to those goods
(a) the quality of the goods available for sale, 
or the varieties of the goods so available 
would be substantially reduced to the detri­
ment of the public as consumers or users of 
those goods; or
(b) the number of establishments in which the 
goods are sold by retail would be substan­
tially reduced to the detriment of the 
public as such consumers or users; or
(c) the prices at which the goods are sold by 
retail would in general and in the long run 
be increased to the detriment of the public 
as such consumers or users; or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(d) the goods would be sold by retail under con­
ditions likely to cause danger to health in 
consequence of their misuse by the public as 
such consumers or users; or
(e) any necessary services actually provided in 
connection with or after the sale of the goods 
by retail would cease to be so provided or 
would be substantially reduced to the detri­
ment of the public as such consumers or users,
and in any such case that the resulting detriment to the public
as consumers or users of the goods in question would outweigh
any detriment to them as such consumers or users (whether by
the restriction of competition or otherwise) resulting from
the maintenance of minimum resale prices in respect of the
goods.^
A substantial number of requests were submitted for ex­
emption from prohibition of resale price maintenance by the 
time of the deadline on November 15, 1964. More recently^ 
there are indications that a growing proportion of the appli­
cations are being withdrawn because of competitive conditions 
or lack of legal basis for the request.
6 The Resale Prices Act, 1964, Bee. 5(2) as quoted by 
B. S, Yatney Resale Price Maintenance and Shopper's Choice, 
(London, 1964) p. 53.
7 See Economist. July 3? 1965, p. 5B.
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United States
The period prior to the 1930»s was characterized by the 
uncertainity of the legal position of resale price maintenance. 
Under the Sherman Act of I89O, the Courts had held individual 
as well as collective price maintenance enforced by agreement 
or contract as illegal in interstate commerce.& But the courts 
upheld the right of manufacturers to refuse to sell to dealers 
who had cut prices substantially,^
Manufacturers interested in establishing resale price 
control could attain it either by refusing to sell to dealers 
who cut prices or by shipping goods to dealers on consignment, 
retaining title until the goods were sold. The only other 
alternative was direct price control through sales agencies 
owned by the manufacturer,
Manufacturers found that refusal to sell enabled them to 
exercise a considerable degree of control over the resale 
price of their distributors (wholesalers). But in the case 
of the retail trade the number of retailers made it difficult 
for most manufacturers to deal directly with them.
Experience with resale price control had shown that
8 See E. R. A, Seligraan and R. A. Love, Price Cutting 
and Price Maintenance. (New York, 1932) p. 54 for a discussion 
of the Hartman and Miles cases,
9 Ibid., pp. 65-8. Cream of Wheat, Goodyear and 
Colgate cases.
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identical retail prices could be secured by means of resale 
price contracta. As a consequence, manufacturers of branded 
merchandise and trade association leaders in the retail field 
- particularly the drug trade • turned their efforts toward 
securing a legalization of resale price maintenance. The 
economic position of wholesalers being closely related to 
the profit return of retailers, they also joined in advocating 
resale price legislation.
The growth of chain and cut-rate stores offering limited 
services and lower prices coupled with the depression In 1930 
gave greater Impetus to the efforts of independent retailers 
and wholesalers to obtain the legalizing of resale price main­
tenance.
The retail and wholesale trade associations in California 
were the most aggressive in their demands. As a result, in 
1931 California became the first state to legalize the use of 
resale price contracts in intrastate commerce. To be eligible 
the commodity concerned was required to bear the trade-mark, 
brand or name of the producer or owner and to be in fair and 
open competition with commodities of the same general class 
produced by others. The agreed upon prices were to prevail 
at all times except for closing out sales, the sale of damaged 
and deteriorated goods, and the sale of goods by order of a 
court.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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An amendment to the California statute in 1933 added the 
highly significant provision that a single agreement to fix 
the resale price of a trade marked product is applicable to 
all other sellers even though they do not sign a price main­
tenance contract. This amendment which came to be known as 
the ”non-signers* clause" made it possible for a manufacturer 
to make a resale price agreement with a single wholesaler or 
retailer and thereupon require all other wholesalers or re­
tailers in the state to charge the same resale price for the 
product. Any distributor having notice of the contractual 
arrangement and not conforming to the prices became at once 
subject to civil action on the charge of unfair competition. 
This clause made the resale price control laws extremely ef­
fective in maintaining prices within the state.
In view of this, the California statute and amendment 
were rapidly adopted by a considerable number of other states 
at the request of organized trade groups.
As the laws applied only to intrastate commerce price 
maintenance still remained illegal in interstate commerce 
under the Sherman Act,
In response to the increasing demands of state and local 
trade associations. Congress in 1937 enacted the Miller- 
Tydings Act, amending the Sherman Act to exempt resale price 
agreements in interstate commerce when commodities are shipped
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Into states for resale where such contracts are legal. Manu­
facturers were now able to enforce price maintenance contracts 
both on an interstate and an Intrastate basis in those states 
which had enacted legislation.
In 1951 the effectiveness of resale price contracts was 
substantially restricted by the Supreme Court in the schweg- 
mann Bros. vs. Calvert Distillers Corp. decision. The Court 
ruled that the Miller-Tydings law does not give immunity to 
non-signer arrangements. Only voluntary, signed resale price 
contracts, it held, are exempted from the Sherman Act,
The Schwegtnann decision invalidated all resale price 
systems in interstate commerce which were based on the use
of non-signer clauses. As a result in some areas, especially 
10New York retail price competition became very intense.
The result was a campaign by retail trade associations 
to have the Federal legislation altered. In July 1952, Con­
gress passed the McGuire Act which made pannissable the use 
of the non-signer clause within a given state, in accordance 
with the legislation of the state, by manufacturers selling 
in interstate commerce.
But the rise of the large Discount houses during the 
early 1950®s created new and costly problems for manufacturers
10 See S, Raymond Corey "Fair Trade Pricing: A Reapprai- 
sal". Harvard Business Review. XXX 5, pp. 47-62,
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enforcing resale price maintenance. The Discount houses 
formed their OKtn association to fight against wholesalers and 
manufacturers who refused to sell to discount houses, protes­
ting that such action was In restraint of trade.
The non-signer clause was ruled unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Courts of thirteen "Pair Trade” states and In two 
other states the Supreme Courts held the entire "Fair Trade" 
act to be invalid.
The cost of policing price maintenance agreements 
became heavier as violations became more frequent. Manufac­
turers began to abandon their fair trade policy, particularly 
in the electric appliance Industry
In September 1955* the Westlnghouse Electric Corporation, 
after six years of setting fà%r trade prices on its products, 
abandoned resale price maintenance. The General Electric 
Company, who had signed approximately 30,000 fair trade agree­
ments with retailers and had policed these agreements aggres­
sively finally abandoned resale price maintenance In February 
1956. The expenditure of approximately one million dollars a 
year for the previous two years reveals the company's favour­
able attitude toward fair trade but at the same time the
11 See Stewart Munro Lee "Problems of Resale Price Main­
tenance", Journal of Marketing. XX31I (January, 1959) pp. 274- 
280 for a more detailed account.
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expenditure indicates how costly such a policy had become.
General Electric was followed one day later by the Sun­
beam Corporation who felt they were forced to make the move 
in order to keep their dealers competitive in the electrical 
appliance market.
A contributing factor to General Electric's decision was 
a setback received in 1957 when the courts ruled that mail 
order sales from the District of Columbia, where there is no 
fair trade law, to New York at prices below those fixed under 
"Pair Trade" agreements in New York did not violate the Hew 
York fair trade statute.
The efforts of the electrical appliance Industry to keep 
resale price maintenance reveals the change in attitude of 
manufacturers from the early history of the practice. Manu­
facturers appear to have become more aggressive than retailers 
in their efforts to retain price maintenance.
The strong growth of discount department stores coupled 
with the rising inclination of aggressive retailers to violate 
resale price agreements and risk or fight legal action, no 
doubt contributed to the decision of manufacturers to abandon 
resale price maintenance In the 1950’s. It would appear that 
resale price maintenance plays an insignificant role in 
American marketing policies to-day.
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Canada
Except for the last two decades there appears to be 
limited reference to resale pries maintenance in Canadian 
journals. This may be a result of uncertainity about the 
legal position of the practice prior to 1951.
Resale price maintenance was concerned in a number of 
investigations under the Combines Investigation Act, but usu­
ally in conjunction with other restrictive practices.
It was the only issue in one inquiry involving the Pro­
prietary Articles Trade Association, an offshoot of a druggists' 
trade organization of the same name in Great Britain. In two 
reports published in 1926 and 1927 the conclusion was expres­
sed that the public interest was detrimentally affected. The 
Proprietary Articles Trade Association was dissolved shortly 
after the final report was published,
A similar conclusion was reached in four other investi­
gations under the Combines Investigation Act, tobacco 1938, 
dental supplies 1947* optical goods 1948, and bread in western 
Canada 1948,
An indication that resale price maintenance was becoming 
fairly widespread following World War II appears in the Report 
of the Royal Commission on Prices rendered in 1949 which states :
12 See Report of Royal Commission on Prices II (Ottawa^ , 
1949), p, 258.
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Throughout our inquiry we have been impressed 
by the degree to which individual manufacturers fix 
the resale prices of their products and so narrow 
the area in which price competition amongst whole­
salers and retailers is operative. In view of the 
extension of this practice, we recommend that the 
Combines Investigation Commission give careful 
study to this problem with a view to devising 
measures to deal with It,^3
The same report reveals that Canadian consumers had be­
come perturbed over the practice, Ihe Canadian Association 
of Consumers and the National Council of Women presented a 
joint brief to the Royal CooMis&ion on Prices expressing con­
cern over the growth of resale price maintenance,
The HacQuarrle Committee was appointed in June 1950 to 
study Combines Legislation, As a result of the recommendation 
of the Royal Commission on Prices, resale price maintenance
was included as part of the study.
The Committee found it difficulti
to measure precisely the extent of resale price 
maintenance, The Committee, however, is satisfied 
that the practice of fixing resale prices is wide­
spread, that it covers whole classes of goods, and 
that, if not quite as comprehensive as the United
Kingdom, it la yat of significant and growing pro­
portions,^*
In its interim report on resale price maintenance
13 Report of the Royal Commission on Prices I (Ottm*a,
1949) p. 41.
14 Resale Price Maintenance. An Interim Report of the 
Committee to Study"Combinas Legislation (Ottawa, 1951) p® 7
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published In October, 1951, the Committee recommended "that 
It should be made an offence for a manufacturer or other sup­
plier:
1. To recommend or prescribe minimum resale prices 
for his products:
2, TO refuse to sell, to withdraw a franchise or 
to take any, other form of action as a means 
of enforcing minimum resale prices.15
As a result Canada became the first country to ban resale 
price maintenance unconditionally when legislation was enacted 
in December 1951. The Director of Investigation and Research 
was allocated the duty of Investigating restrictive practices 
forbidden by the Act. % e  Restrictive Trade Practices Com­
mission became responsible for examining evidence submitted 
to it by the Director,
An extensive public inquiry into loss-leader selling and 
the effects of abolishing resale price maintenance resulted 
in two reports^^ published in 1954 and 1955 In which it was 
concluded that no new legislation was warranted for suppression 
or control of loss-leader selling.
Section 34 of the Combines Investigation Act which deals
15 Resale Price Maintenance. An Interim Report, p, 21,
16 (a) Loss-Leader Selling. Material Collected by the 
Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade 
Practices Conmiisslon, Ottawa, 1954,
(b) Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling, 
ibid., 1955.
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with resale price maintenance was amended in I960, Under the 
amendment a manufacturer can now refuse to sell to anyone who 
is using his product as a loss-leader, that is, not for the 
purpose of making a profit but for advertising or attracting 
customers to his store in the hope of selling them other art­
icles. The manufacturer may also refuse to sell to anyone 
engaged in misleading advertising of his product or anyone 
falling to provide a level of servicing that purchasers might 
reasonably expect.
On examination this amendment might lead manufacturers 
to attempt to enforce some type of minirapn price based on the 
interpretation of the word profit,
Recent Developments in European Legislation^^
Since the action of Canada to ban resale price mainten­
ance, the governments of several European countries have taken 
measures to abolish or limit the use of resale price mainten­
ance.
In 1953 Sweden enacted legislation making resale price 
maintenance subject to criminal p.'enalties where permission is
17 See Report Concerning the Piatrlbutlon and Sale of 
Electric Appliances, Electric Shavers and Accessory Products, 
(sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Limited) Ottawa, 1962,
18 The following summary is drawn almost exclusively from 
O.E.C.D. Restrictive Business Practices, Comparative Summary 
of Legislation in Europe and North America (Paris, 1964),
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not granted by the Freedom of Commerce Board, In spite of 
wide legislative grounds for granting permission only three 
exemptions were granted between 1953 and 1962 and only recently 
one of these was withdrawn.
France adopted a similar attitude toward resale price 
maintenance in the same year. Prohibition of the practice 
Is the rule and exemptions are the exception and are "very 
rarely granted".
Denmark enacted legislation in 1955 which included a 
general prohibition of resale price maintenance unless special 
permission is granted by the cartel authority. Between 1955 
and 1963 exemptions were granted to ten products.
Ireland has indicated a growing disapproval of the prac­
tice, Although no legislation has been enacted to prohibit 
resale price maintenance generally* six rulings were made pro­
hibiting the practice in various trades between 1955 and 1962,
Germany joined the increasing list of countries legislat­
ing against resale price maintenance in 1957. The approach 
adopted has been more lenient than other countries with exemp­
tions being rather numerous.
Norway by way of Royal Decree also became a member of the 
group of countries prohibiting resale price maintenance in 
1957. Exceptions are allowed but have seldom been granted.
19 Ibid.. p. 19
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only throe exemptions resulting between 1957 and 1961.
The increase in legislation directed at abolishing or 
limiting the practice of resale price maintenance appears to 
Indicate an increasing doubt of the validity of arguments 
favouring acceptance of resale price maintenance. The next 
chapter Is devoted to a consideration of the arguments more 
frequently encountered.
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FREQUENT ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE PRACTICE 
In examining the most prevalent arguments in support:of 
resale price maintenance the following point should be kept in 
mind;
When discussing the motives which induce dis­
tributors and manufacturers to support resale price 
maintenance, one has to take into consideration a 
source of error that àâ always present in cases 
where human interest are involved; the parties con­
cerned tend to omit or under-emphasiae the more 
selfish motives behind their actions and to make 
much of their concern for the public welfare. To 
obtain a true picture of the situation, it is, 
therefore, necessary to make a critical appraisal 
of the motives publicly stated and also to consider 
whether there may not be other motives as well.l
A frequent argument in favour of resale price maintenance 
contends that it helps to keep the small independent retailer 
in business, thus ensuring an adequate number of outlets and 
preventing concentration of economic power, Ohls result would 
be achieved because resale price maintenance requires all dis­
tributors to sell at a uniform price providing an adequate 
margin of profit for all.
Without resale price maintenance large department and 
chain stores operating at a lower unit cost are in a position 
to charge a lower price than the small retailer. % e  large
1 Soren Gammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris, 
1958) p. 36.
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retailers are also in a favourable position to use the "loss- 
leader" device in order to attract oiore business and gradually 
eliminate the small retailers. In addition the large stores 
have contï*oî over their private brands and without resale price 
maintenance price cutting would occur only on products also 
handled by dealers whose volume of trade is already too small 
to enable them to carry their own brands* As a result of 
these advantages the larger outlets would Increase their share 
of the market forcing the small retailer out of business*
The first presumption in the argument is that all small 
retailers should be protected from the price competition of 
large retailers, particularly the department and chain stores, 
or the small retailer will disappear,
There Is no doubt that without the protection of resale 
price maintenance the chances of survival of the inefficient 
and marginal operators among the small retailers are greatly 
reduced,
Data in Table 1 indicate: a tendency to larger retail 
outlets but at the same time would appear to suggest that the 
small retailer has continued to survive despite the banning of
resale price, maintenance in Canada,
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Table 1
gercent; Change In the Number of Selected Types of 
of Retail Stores In Ontario 1951 to 1961*
Total Ontario 15.7
Tobacco stores and stands -7.5
Books and stationery stores 60.0
Hardware stores 13.7
Household appliance stores -8.7
Jewellery stores 10.8
Drug stores - ÿ.o
Department stores 58.6
Furniture. T.V.. radio and apollanoes
*Source: Census of Canada, 1961.
During a similar period in the United Kingdcmi the same 
tendency to larger retail outlets was present even though re­
sale price maintenance was in effect. During this period 
from 1950 to 1961 the number of small retailers declined by 
6,000 indicating that resale price maintenance does not nec­
essarily protect the Inefficient small retailer.
In Canada the greatest price conq>etition in some instances 
has come not from the large department stores and chains but 
from the growing independent retailer who only a few years 
previous was a small retailer himself «3 effect has been
changes in retailing methods with resulting benefits for
2 See "RFM - The Castle %mble@". Economist (March 13* 
1965) pp. 1157-58.
3 See Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling. 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa* 1955) pp. 49- 
52.
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consumers.
The second portion of the same argument assumes that the 
concentration of economic power in the retail field is neces­
sarily against the interests of the consumer.
Resale price maintenance has tended to appear in indus­
tries in which there are relatively few well established manu­
facturers with systems of national distribution. The situa­
tion approaches that outlined by J. K. Galbraith^ in which a 
market has been pre-empted by a few large sellers, entry of 
new firms has become difficult and existing firms have accep­
ted a convention against price coi^etition. Strong sellers, 
the manufacturers, in control of prices are opposed by weak 
buyers.
"In the typical modem market of few sellers the active 
restraint is provided not by cong>etitors but from the other 
side of the market by strong buyers".5 The development of 
economic power by retailers will serve the interest of the 
consumer as the large retailers use their bargaining power to 
exert pressure on the margins of manufacturers. "Retailers 
are required by their situation to develop countervailing 
power on the consumer's behalf.
4 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism. (Boston, 
1956) p. 113.
5 Ibid.. p. 112.
6 Ibid.. p. 117,
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Without resale price maintenance, price competition 
among distributors and the resulting reduction of gross profit 
margins will tend to give rise to increasing demands from all 
distributors that manufacturers reduce their prices to them.
As price competition is likely to favour the larger and more 
active retailers, their bargaining strength as opposed to the 
manufacturer Is increased making the possibility of obtaining 
a price concession from manufacturers more likely.
Two frequent arguments that are closely related are that 
resale price maintenance (l) prevents vertical integration 
and (2) protects the specialized retailer. By accomplishing 
the protection of the specialized retailer the reason for the 
need of vertical integration is also eliminated. The conaaon 
basis for both arguments is the need for specialized selling 
and aftersale service for so-called technical goods - electric 
appliances, radios, television.
The argument states th&t without resale price maintenance 
competition will drive prices to such a level that retailers 
will not want to handle the product or will not provide the 
aftersale service; which is required. Consequently manufactur­
ers may decide to establish their own retail outlets to ensure 
proper aftersale service.
The protection of the specialized dealer is considered 
necessary to ensure an efficient system of distribution in the
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field of technical goods. The consumer will receive no bargain 
if he should purchase an electrical appliance at a low price 
if it falls and he finds it impossible to obtain parts or 
service.
Canadian experience has disproved these arguments.^ In 
the electrical ^pliance industry Inppartlcular, servicing 
requirements have been much less than indicated. S«ae retail­
ers have hired special service con^anles to carry out their 
servicing. In some of the larger centres manufacturers have 
established their own service centres. Pre selling by manu­
facturers and greater conswner knowledge have greatly decreased 
the need for specialized knowledge in selling.
Supporters have also argued that resale price maintenance 
prevents the use of monopoly power at the retail level and the 
resulting excessive prices. The basis of the reasoning is 
that without resale price maintenance prices of an individual 
manufacturer's product would vary in different localities 
dependent upon whether there was more than one dealer in its 
products. In small localities served by only one dealer, 
prices would tend to increase out of line with large coomani- 
ties where there are a number of dealers.
According to this argument* competitive conditions are
7 See Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling. 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa* 1955) pp. 112- 
123.
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too readily assumed throughout the retail field. Each retail­
er has a certain amount of Influence over a section of his 
clientele even if faced with a large number of competitors. 
This monopolistic aspect increases as the number of ccHnpeti- 
tors decreases. One seller in a «nail community may have con­
siderable monopoly power. With resale price maintenance how­
ever, monopoly power does not present any threat since main­
tained prices are maxieaun as well as minimum.8
This argianent overlooks one of the main characteristics 
of retailing, the ease of entry. If a retailer is the only 
dealer in a community and charges excessive prices, the 
incentive exists to set up a competitive outlet, undersell ttie 
existing retailer and still obtain an adequate profit. In 
addition, the location of the eomnunity in relation to sur­
rounding communities will be a limiting factorw Excessive 
prices may drive patronage to a neighboring eonmiunlty.
Another argument in the same vein is that resale price 
maintenance results in a more stable price structure and pre­
vents excessive prices in both directions. The emphasis is 
on the retarding effect on the upward pressure of prices. In 
times of scarcity resale price maintenance is argued to pre­
vent the charging of excessive prices with the resulting
8 Canadian legislation countered this argument by allow­
ing suppliers to set a "maximum" resale price.
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exorbitant profits.
Prices under a resale price system will be slower to move 
up or down for two reasons. First, the structure of the sys­
tem Itself will require infrequent changes. Frequent changes 
could result in loss of dealer and consumer confidence and 
would also make It difficult to coordinate advertising policies 
Secondly, manufacturers margins are likely to be more than 
adequate and consequently less sensitive to coat increases.
In times of scarcity It is doubtful if the manufacturer 
will be able to maintain the price if pressure is strong. The 
retailer has other alternatives to increasing prices openly to 
obtain an increased return from the product. Under the coun­
ter transactions are difficult to detect and would require a 
great deal of policing on the part of the manufacturer.
This argument also assumes that price stability is desir­
able. Flexible prices are necessary to adjust to changing 
conditions of supply and demand. In times of shortage of 
supply price adjustment is the natural means of determining 
who will receive the available supply unless government inter­
vention is warranted. Conversely when demand is low price 
cuts are desired in an effort to stimulate demand and maintain 
production and employment.
The most frequent argument advanced by the manufacturer 
is his need for protection by resale price maintenance from
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the use of his product as a "loss-leader". Such use is 
alleged to damage the manufacturer's interests in several ways, 
It results in the loss of public confidence in the product. 
Because of the unprofitable price it may influence retailers 
to push substitute goods on which they can make an adequate 
profit, The "loss-leader" practice may lead to the loss of 
retail outlets to the manufacturer as retailers find it is 
not profitable to handle his product and discontinue stocking 
it.
The "loss-leader" is the most controversial aspect of the 
arguments concerning retail price maintenance. It is related 
to practically every argument submitted by retailer» whole­
saler and manufacturer who support resale price maintenance. 
Consequently it has been given separate attention in the next 
chapter.
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THE LOSS-LEADER QUESTION 
After first outlinig the main arguments advanced to sup­
port the need of resale price maintenance to prevent "loss- 
leaders" this chapter will discuss the Interpretation and def­
inition of the concept of a "loss-leader". This will be fol­
lowed by a rebuttal to the arguments and a summary of attempts 
or recommendations short of resale price maintenance which 
have been made with the view of controlling loss-leaders.
"Loss-leaders" it is maintained are products which are 
sold at a loss with the purpose of drawing customers to the 
retail outlet who will not only buy the loss-leader but also 
other articles carrying normal or high profits. The objective 
is to obtain profits from the sale of other conanodities to new 
customers which will more than offset the loss resulting from 
the leader.
In some instances it has been said that this practice is 
actually unfair to the customer. The reasoning is that the 
prices of other goods must necessarily be higher than in other 
retail outlets in order to cover the loss of the leader.
It is further argued that unless their resale prices are 
maintained established brands in general demand will always be 
used as loss-leaders by some retailers. Resulting price
37
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competition will force down the prices of the brand concerned 
throughout the market area to the same low level. Ultimately 
retail margins will be reduced to the point where dealers will 
no longer be interested in selling these brands. Manufacturers' 
sales will suffer both from the loss of retail outlets and the 
loss of customer confidence and goodwill, With all retailers 
prices at the sane low level, those retailers who made the 
original price cut will have no further competitive advantage 
and will turn to new brands as loss-leaders.
Consequently there is a continual tendency to disturb the 
market of well-known brands. The manufacturers of these brands 
require resale price maintenance to protect their interests, 
îhe market fluctuations resulting from the use of branded pro­
ducts as loss-leaders will make steady production and sale of 
the goods impossible. In order to maximize economies in the 
production of branded goods resale price maintenance is neces­
sary and therefore in the interest of consumers.
Ihe basis of the loss-leader reasoning is open to criti­
cism from two points of view. First, the very concept of a 
loss-leader has never attained an acceptable exact definition. 
Second, the required assumptions for price competition to re­
sult in the reasoned disruption of turnover and production are 
very precise with the consequence they are rarely found in 
practice.
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The Canadian Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in
its inquiry into loss-leader selling found:
that a major difficulty in approaching the examina­
tion of practices alleged to Involve loss-leader 
selling, is to obtain a clear description of the 
foms of selling which would unmistakably constitute 
such a practice, and not merely active price con- 
petition. Indeed a satisfactory definition is so 
elusive that a number of those appearing before the 
Commission stated that they did not know how loss- 
leader selling should be defined, or that there was 
no point in trying to define it, or that it cannot 
be defined.!
% e  term "loss-leader" suggests the distinctive feature 
of an item sold at a price involving a financial loss. The 
problem arises in selecting a yardstick to separate loss-leader 
competition from ordinary price competition, that is to deter­
mine when prices involve a loss and when they do not.
In their inquiry the Restrictive Trade Practices Commis­
sion found that definitions submitted fell roughly into two 
categories "depending on whether the emphasis in the definition 
was in terms of the purpose of the price cut or whether it was 
in terms of the extent of the price cut"
In the definition of loss-leader selling which gave empha­
sis to the extent of the price cut, the price below which it 
was argued an article could not be sold without being considered
1 Report on An Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling. Restric­
tive Trade Practices Commission. (Ottawa, 1955) p. 7.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
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a loss-leader, ranged through the entire scope from the manu­
facturer's suggested retail price to the lower of invoice or 
replacement cost.
As a result it becomes difficult to determine just what 
is really meant by "loss-leader" cc^etition. The objective 
of all forms of competition Is to obtain new customers, or 
keep old ones, with the view of raising or stabilising sales 
and increasing net profits.
According to economic theory, a specific price results 
in a loss to a retailer if be would be better off by not sell­
ing the product at all than by doing so at the price consid­
ered, Using this analysis a loss is suffered only if the pur­
pose of the loss-leader is not realized, That purpose is to 
Increase the total net profit of the retailer, the loss of 
the leader being more than offset by the profit on the increa­
sed turnover of other goods. Because of the close connection 
which sometimes exists between the sale of various merchandise 
in a store the purpose may be accomplished in spite of the 
fact that the leader is sold below its invoice cost to the 
retailer.
By the same reasoning it is apparent that retailers who 
use loss-leaders will not necessarily charge higher prices 
for other goods than their con^etitors.^ It is possible with
3 Ibid., pp. 95-101.
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their prices of other goods equal to or lower than their com­
petitor's prices that the net profit on the increased sale of 
those goods may exceed the loss on the leader. It is Impor­
tant to note in this respect that the operating costs of a 
retail outlet in the very short run may be considered in the 
most part fixed or overhead costs. Consequently the increase 
in costs resulting fran a larger turnover will not greatly exi-i 
ceed the invoice price of the additional goods sold.
It is apparent that the usual criterion of economic theory 
to distinguish profitable from unprofitable pricing would not 
be applicable in separating loss-leader competition from ordi­
nary price coR^etition. Using principles of economic theory, 
loss-leader competition would include only those cases where 
the Objective of using loss-leaders was not achieved, the pro­
fit on the increased turnover of other goods failed to cover 
the loss on the leader. Such z*esults being viewed as tactical 
errors resulting in iquick correction it cannot be against such 
incidents that the major claim to protection from loss-leader 
competition is raised.
Another definition frequently encountered is that loss- 
leader competition exists when the prices of leaders in iso­
lation do not cover the cost Involved in selling those leaders^
4 See Soren Gammelgaard. Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris 
1958) p. 49, and Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa, 1955) p. 11.
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difficulty arises in deteiwlnlng the selling costs invol­
ved^ as overhead costs are ocmmon to all goods sold. The 
distribution of overhead costs over the various articles of 
merchandise has no generally approved application. Goods sold 
in the same store contribute in an unecpial degree to the cov­
ering of these costs. Therefore It would not be feasible to 
argue that loss-leader competition exists where goods do not 
contribute proportionally to the covering of overhead costs.
This suggests that in deciding which costs are involved 
in selling the leader we should disregard overhead costs. As 
practically all operating costs in the very short run are 
overhead costs^ this definition then implies in practice that 
goods are only loss-leaders when they are sold below their 
purchase price. But this would require further qualification 
so as not to include perishable items sold below cost to limit 
loss, sales in trades with seasonal pricing where it is con­
sidered legitimate practice to sell goods out-of-season at 
strongly reduced prices; sales of bankrupt firms and clearance 
sales of old stocks.
A further definition would identify loss-leaders as art­
icles sold with a smaller margin than other merchandise belon­
ging to the same general category in the same store.^ But ag#n
5 See Soren Oammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance, ibid., 
p. 50.
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a problem arises in arriving at a standard. Some goods are 
of a distinctive nature allowing no comparison. Even where 
there is a basis for comparison, brands with a slower rate of 
turnover would carry higher margins than quicker-moving brands, 
if competition were totally free and were unaffected by restric­
tive influences or practices.
This definition is too inclusive, as it is not concerned 
with the absolute level of margins, but only with the relative 
level. As a result loss-leader competition would be identified 
as )all cases where a brand is sold at a lesser margin than 
other brands of the same type of goods, whether a loss is 
suffered or a profit is gained.
Professor B, S. Yamey defines a "loss-leader" as "a 
’leader* Item which is re-sold below its trade price to the 
shopkeeper"
It would appear that the definiticm of a "loss-leader" 
in order to be consistent with the literal term would include 
goods sold for a purpose other than contributing, in isolation, 
directly to the gross profit of the retailer. This would 
Include all goods sold at or below invoice price to the re­
tailer. Merchandise sold at invoice cost certainly will not 
contribute directly to the gross profit of the retailer and in
6 B, S, Yamey, Resale Price Maintenance and Shipper’s 
Choice. (London, 1964) p. 27,
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most cases would involve scwie loss on the sale In isolation 
of the goods concerned due to minimal handling costs for any 
merchandise carried. The definition should exclude goods sold 
at or below cost for the purpose of clearing end of season 
stock or broken and discontinued lines, or for the:purpose 
of raising money to meet urgent cash requirement or disposing 
of stock of banlcpupt firms.
It is apparent from the numerous surveys carried out by 
different governments that "loss-leader competition is all too 
often used to describe pries competition which is coming from 
new types or methods of retailing.
It is difficult to see how the use of a "loss-leader" or ft 
any type of price competition can be unfair to the consumer 
as claimed. Lower prices are hardly a hardship on the consumer. 
There no doubt have been instances where retailers have 
used leaders with the Intention of trapping the gullible. The 
major use of the leader has been as a type of advertisement 
designed to attract customers to the retailers premises.
If the retailer has made a selective price cut(s) and 
left the remaining articles at competitive prices, custonora 
are better off by the amount of the saving on the leader item. 
Even if the retailer has raised the prices of other mer­
chandise, a purchaser of this merchandise is only worse off 
if his increased expenditure on these articles in greater than
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the saving on the leader.
But the argument of increased prices on other merchandise 
is contradictory in nature. On one hand we have a consumer 
who is sensitive to advertised bargains and yet on the other 
Is not conscious of the competitive prices on other goods.
Tills is very inconsistent behaviour when we consider the vol­
ume of price advertising plus many other methods of price ccm- 
parison.
The Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in a survey^ 
involving grocery retailing found that in the three geogr^hi- 
cal areas surveyed the prices of other goods in the "loss- 
leader" stores were on the average four to seven per cent 
below the prices of identical goods in comparable shops which 
did not use "loss-leaders”, Veiy few items showed any differ­
ence in the opposite direction.
In considering manufacturers* claims that their products 
will suffer loss of sales because of use as loss-leaders, the 
question arises as to wliat conditions would cause a result so 
opposed to accepted economic laws of supply and demand,
TO attain the result claimed by manufacturers that price 
reductions by aggressive retailers in various locations will 
drive prices down to the same level everywhere, the demand for
7 See Report on an Inquiry Into Loss-Leader Selling, Re­
strictive Trade Practices Commission, (Ottawa, 1955) pp. 97- 
101,
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the product involved must be very senaltive to price differ­
ences. In addition, the knowledge of prices must be very 
general,
For a manufacturer to suffer unfavourable results from 
price competition mong retailers it must be the retailer and 
not the coimumer who decides which brands are sold. Only 
under this assumption would it be possible for sales to decrease 
when prices are reduced. This is contradictory to the basic 
economic reasoning that consumers buy more as prices are re- 
duced.G
The argument of the manufacturer that prices of his brand 
will be forced down by competition between retailers to a 
point where many retailers will no longer be interested in 
selling his brand must be based on several assumptions. First, 
the price must be at or below the invoice price to the retailer. 
Secondly, the price must be kept at this point for a consider­
able period of time, not just for a few days or a week as in 
the case In special sales. Thirdly, the retailer is willing 
to risk loss of customers goodwill by not having available a 
widely advertised well known product.9 Fourthly, the retailer
8 Assuming levels of income and distribution of income 
are held constant,
9 retailer may overcome this by stocking the manu­
facturer’s product but not "pushing" its sale.
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has a substitute brand on which the margin is adequate and
which can in moat cases be substituted for the dropped brand
without injuring customer good will to any extent.
In their inquiry into loss-leader selling the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission concluded:
that sales below net purchase cost for the purpose 
of increasing the seller’s general sales volume are 
made ixif3;>eqath|ply, and when such selling is engaged 
in it is generally for periods of short duration.
The offering of goods in such a manner appears to 
result fyom active competition among merchants of 
comparable standing, and not from market domination 
by any one dealer or group of dealers.10
It would then appear the purpose served by selling below 
cost is to obtain effective advertising to attract customers 
to the store, % e  objective is an Immediate stimulus to con­
sumers, a bargain which is available for a limited time. The 
continual use of one item as a loss-leader would tend to ex­
haust its attraction and to establish the loss-leader price as 
the consistent price in the consumeras mind, The retailer 
using the loss-leader technique must find new bargains to main­
tain the effectiveness of his advertising and keep the consumer 
interest.
The manufacturer who argues that the retailer will drop 
his brand because of retail price competition must make the 
assumption that competitive brands will not be exposed to use
10 Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selli^. Restric­
tive Trade Practices Commission (6ti:awa, p. 2^
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as loss leaders or to price competition. At the same time he 
must discount the effectiveness of his advertising and the 
popularity of his product.
If a retailer discontinues carrying a well established 
regularly advertised product he immediately supplies a perfect 
reason for any of his customers who wish to purchase the prod­
uct to patronise hia competitor.
The asaunqxtion that a suitable substitute exists for the 
discontinued stock must be based on the presumption that the 
substitute has a maintained price and therefore an adequate 
margin. This la Inconsistent since without resale price main­
tenance all brands would be exposed to use as "loss-leaders? 
and to price competition.
A manufacturer will undoubtedly lose some dealers, the in­
efficient through their inability to survive and some who may 
eliminate his product from their merchandising policy. This 
does not mean his total sales volume expressed in units of 
product will fall.
The efforts of competitive dealers to maintain and in­
crease sales and the resulting lower prices will be compelling 
factors leading to increased product sales volume for the manu­
facturer,
Manufacturers' arguments that sales volume will fall may 
be based on dollar sales volume and it cannot be denied that
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dollar sales volume may fall If prices are pushed d m m  far 
enough but product sales volime may increase nevertheless.
The measures proposed to eliminate "loss-leader" selling 
range from resale price maintenance to reliance on legislation 
which prevents the use of economic power to eliminate competi­
tion.
One of the most common proposals outside of resale price 
maintenance Is for legislation to make any distributor liable 
to legal action if he should sell or advertise for sale any 
products as "loss-leaders". The action may be civil or crim­
inal.
Loss-leader is defined as selling below cost where cost 
is defined as the price to the distributor plus a specified 
mark-up. Such proposals normally Include an exemption for 
certain types of sales, legitimate clearance sales, sales of 
perishable or aeasonad goods and goods sold under court order.
Legislation prohibiting the use of such loss-leaders in 
certain product lines was passed during the 1930's In three 
western provinces, Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia. In 
each case the required mark up on total cost to the retailer 
was five percent. Similar legislation enacted in various 
states of the United States contain stipulated percentage mark 
ups ranging from six to as high as twelve percent.
The proposal of The Retail Merchants Association of Canada
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Inc. to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission recommen­
ded a mark up equal to "the distributor's or vendor's cost of 
doing business. In the absence of proof of the cost of doing 
business such cost shall be prima facie the lowest operating 
cost shown by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics' most recent 
report the type of classification of trade involved,
The adoption of any proposal stipulating a minimum re­
quired mark up establlshsa lower limit for all retail margins. 
In the case of low margin items it may actually operate to 
increase prices.
Variations exist within any one establishment with re­
spect to margins on different merchandise resulting from dif­
ferences in handling costs and rate of turnover. In addition 
costs vary between retailers in the same line of business and 
possibly to a greater extent between retailers In different 
types of business handling the sane product. Consequently 
such limitations of margins will hamper retailers in their 
attempt to market their merchandise most effectively.
American esqperienoe with such legislation in various
12
states has indicated the limitations of such measures. The
11 Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Selling. Restrie, 
tlve Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa, 1955), p. 230.
12 See Loss-Leader Selling. Material Collected by Direc­
tor of Investigation, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission 
(Ottawa, 1954), pp. 279-85.
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lack of interest in enforcement stems f r m  the reluctance of 
retailers to file complaints or bring suits against competit­
ors. Enforcement of such legislation by a government bogy 
would entail a tremendous administrative burden in policing 
the various prices concerned,
The i960 amendment to the Canadian Legislation has returned 
the Initiative to the manufacturer. % e  amendment n^adst
(5) Where, in a prosecution under this section, it 
is proved that the person charged refused or coun­
selled the refusal to sell or supply an article to 
sny other person, no inference unfavourable to the 
person charged shall be drawn from such evidence if 
he satisfies the court that he and any one upon whose 
report he depended had reasonable cause to believe 
and did believe
(a) that the other person was msdcing a prac­
tice of using articles supplied by the person 
charged as loss-leaders, that is to say, not 
for the purpose of making a profit thereon 
but for purposes of advertising!
(b) that the other person was making a prac­
tice of using articles supplied by the person 
charged not for the purpose of selling such 
articles at a profit but for the purpose 
attracting customers to his store in the hope 
of selling them other articles;
(c) that the other person was making a prac­
tice of engaging in misleading advertising in 
respect of articles supplied by the person 
charged; or
(d) that the other person made a practice of 
not providing the level of servicing that pur- 
chasess of such articles ml^t reasonably 
expect from such other person.13
13 Combines Investigation Act. Revised Statutes of CansK^ a 
(Ottawa, 19éo)'Part V, Section S'+iS). See Appendix.
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This amendment now gives the manufacturer a basis for 
establishing a mlnlnmm resale price, Tbis price would consist 
of the cost of the product to the retailer plus a stipulated 
mark-up which the manufacturer has "reasonable cause to believe" 
to be necessary if the product is to be sold at a profit.
In other words it is the manufacturer who now defines the 
"loss-leader". As a means to maintaining his minimum resale 
price it «appears the manufacturer can now legally withhold 
supplies.
An excellent example of this is revealed in the Report of 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission on an Investigation 
into the distribution policies of the Sunbeam Corporation 
(Canada) Limited.
Commenting on the passage of the ameWment one of the 
company's executives in a letter to the president of the 
parent American c<xnpany writes:
In the meantime we are making certain investi­
gations with some of the local economists and sta­
tisticians to try and obtain as much information as 
we can about average profits by most electric appli­
ance retailers in an effort to have some basis on 
which we can justify our refusal to sell these fel­
lows who are loss-leadering. All we have to have 
is reason to believe they are doing this and any 
accurate statistical information that we have can 
be used as a basis.^4
14 Report Concerning the Distribution and Sale of Elec­
tric Appliances. Electric Shavers and Accessory Products 
(Sunbem Corporation (Canada) Limited ) Restrictive Trade Prac- 
tices Commission (ott^a, 1962), p. 14.
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Subsequently the company embarked on a marketing progrmn 
designed to "establish minimum profitable resale prices for 
d e a l e r s " . resulted in an enquiry toy the Director of 
Investigation and Research under the Coaâjines Investigation 
Act with the evidence and argument toeing presented to the Re­
strictive Trades Practices Conmission in June, 1962. At the 
time of writing a decision is pending on the Court action which 
resulted from the investigation,^^
The time consuming procedure involved in bringing such 
actions tù court must operate to the benefit of the manufac­
turer's marketing plan. Supplies have been effectively with­
held from retailers concerned for a lengthy period with its 
implications to the remaining dehlers.^7
The only effective method which appears open to the re­
tailer under this legislation is to submit proof to the dis­
tributor or manufacturer tliat his average cost is less than 
the minimum mark-up stressed by the manufacturer. It would
15 Ibid., p. 16.
16 The decision will not be available until after a dec­
ision is rendered on the constitutionality of resale price 
maintenance in a ease brought by Mr. Cooper Caoqpbell of Toronto 
contending that Section 34 (2) (b ) of the Act (see Appendix A) 
is ultra virés on the grounds that the section contravenes the 
constitution.
17 % e  possibility exists under the Act for the retailer 
to obtain on injunction preventing the manufacturer from with­
holding supplies but it has not been used.
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%)pear that retailers are reluctant to reveal their financial 
books to manufacturers and in any case accounting differences 
would undoubtedly contribute to disagreements on the statements 
submitted.
Even if the retailer were to establish his average costs 
as lying below the minimum maiic-up believed by the manufacturer 
to be profitable it would appear he would still be required 
to mark-up the product the amount of his average cost. As 
mentioned previously mark-ups on various items handled by a 
retail outlet can vary considerably depending on handling costs 
and rate of turnover. Consequently the mark-up on low margin 
items would be increased under this method.
It appears that any legislation designed to control or 
eliminate "loss-leaders" will be open to criticism. The fact 
that the concept of a loss-leader is not precise but has a wide 
range of meanings to various people may be an insurmountable 
obstacle. The establishing of a minimum mark-up creates a 
barrier which competitive forces are prevented from possibly 
passing.
The banning of sales at or below net cost to the distrib­
utor would protect the manufacturer from the obvious case 
where his product is being used for advertising. But even this 
legislation would require qualification for certain special 
sales. Indications are that sales at or below cost are
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relatively rare and consequently such legislation would be of 
little value,
% e  use of legislation designed to control measures aimed 
at eliminating a oompetitor^9 would appear adequate to deal 
with any cases of grave loss-leading.
In Chapter II it was noted that the early organized move­
ments to obtain resale price maintenance originated with the 
independent small retailers who have continued to support the 
practice. In the next chapter an attempt is made to determine 
the possible reasons which motivate the small retailer in his 
support and to assess the economic effects of resale price 
maintenance on the distribution system.
18 See Report on an Inquiry into Loaa-Leadfer/.Selling, 
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa, 1955) p, 262,
19 See Appendix A, Section 33A, B Ss C,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V
THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OP RESALE PRICE WAIHTSNAMCS 
AT THE DISTRIBUTION LEVEL
Although it is the manufacturer who operates a system of 
individual resale price maintenance the initiative does not 
always come from this source. Soren Oammelgaard found "that 
more often than not it is the retailer and their trade associ­
ation who induce the manufacturers to adopt this method of 
price fixing"
B, S. Yaraey writing about the origins of resale price 
maintenance in the United Klngd<m states*
"With perhaps a few exceptions, the story of 
the beginnings of r.p.m. is that of the activities 
of organized bodies of shopkeepers, operating on 
traditional lines with the provision of more-or- 
less elaborate services at relatively high costs, 
seeking to induce manufacturers of branded goods to 
protect them against the competition of other re­
tailers willing and able to work on lower gross 
margins and to sell at lower retail prices, because 
of their greater efficiency or their less exten­
sive retailing services."^
It was through the aggressive campaigning of the retail 
and wholesale trade organizations In California that the first 
"Fair Trade" legislation was passed in 1931 in the United State a «
1 Soren Oammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris, 
1958), p. 35.
2 B. S, Yamey, Resale Price Maintenance and Shopper's 
Choice. (London, 1964), p. 11.
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Regardless of what arguments laay be forthccmlng retailers 
and wholesalers will favour resale price maintenance over no 
price maintenance only if there is some economic benefit to 
be obtained. In order to induce business men to Wopt the 
practice, resale price maintenance must result in higher or 
safer profits or at least be thougiit to do so.
The primary concern of the retailers who support resale 
price maintenance must be protection of profits, the mainten­
ance of the "status quo". Resale price maintenance assists the 
established retailer in keeping hla segment of the max^et.
The monopolistic elements which determine the individual 
retailers market in the absence of price competition are pri­
marily of a spatial and personal nature. The convenience of 
location, shopping habits, treatment in the past, preference 
for the retailer, his staff and amenities are all factors which 
assist in holding more particularly the patronage of the small 
retailer.
The consumer is unlikely to be tempted into changing his 
shopping pattern unless some relatively substantial benefit is 
to toe obtained. Resale price maintenance tends to eliminate 
the most potent attraction, lower prices.
It may be argued that the consumer could be attracted by 
a low price on goods which do not have resale price maintenance. 
But this will depend upon the prevalence of resale price
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maintenance.
Where only a few products have maintained prices it may 
prove effective but where resale price maintenance is generally 
prevalent price outs on non-maintalned articles would have to 
be relatively substantial. In either case the consumer may 
end up by buying less expensive articles at the competitive 
retail outlet and the price maintained articles from the small 
retailer. Also, the general prevalence of resale price main­
tenance may contribute to the consumers' acceptance of the 
prices of the maall retailer on non-maintained articles.
Resale price maintenance thus tends to maintain the influ­
ence of location a small retailer has over his market. Encroach* 
ment by coi^etltive retailers is hampered because they are 
limited in their use of price cos^tltion.
In ældition resale price maint^anoe makes the entry of 
new retailers into an established market nx>re difficult. The 
most effective method available to the new retailer to attract 
customers to his premises is the offer of lower prices. The 
more widespread the use of resale price maintenance the more 
difficult it is to use this method to establish a required 
volume of trade, 9he practice thus affords the small non 
aggressive retailer some protection against both established 
and new con^etitors.
Individual resale price maintenance could be used as a
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round about method of obtaining a horizontal price agreement 
among retailers. Should a group of retailers tacitly agree 
among themselves that they wish to maintain the price of an 
article this objective can be attained by persuading the 
manufacturer to loqxlement a program of resale price mainten­
ance. It is actually more effective than a horizontal agree­
ment as the manufacturer will have i^ans of disciplining those 
who do not adhere to the price.
The elimination of price competition by the general use 
of price maintenance affects retailing methods and techniques 
and most important, retailing costs. Competition is not ended 
even if all merchandise handled is price maintained. Resale 
price maintenance eliminates the most effective tool of com­
petition and drives con^etitive energies into other channels. 
The resulting diversion of coo^etition aitay from competitive 
price re(|u4tion tends to Increase the amount of resources 
devoted to the provision of retail services.
Price maintenance does not eliminate the possi­
bility of modifications in the structure of retail 
trades, but generally works in favour of established 
firms by retarding change and by eliminating price 
competition, the most effective instrument of change.3
With price competition abolished or limited in effect,
non-price competition increases. Since a retailer cannot
3 B. S, Yamey, % e  EoonCTnios of Resale Price Maintenance 
(London, 1954), p. 87,
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increase his sales by striving to reduce costs and prices, 
competitive effort tends to result in cost Increases through 
larger exp^itures on advertising, attractive store furnish­
ings and displays, easy credit, free delivery services in 
attempts to stimulate buying. Resale price maintenance diverts 
effort from cost-decreasing measures while promoting cost- 
increasing systems of selling. % e  consumer is denied the 
benefits of lower costs and the choice of variations in ser­
vice.
It is easy for the consumer to decide where to buy when 
identical articles are sold at a lower price in one store than 
in another particularly as the lower price outlet will be sure 
to publicize its advantage. Customers can also calculate the 
amount of saving achieved by switching to a new source.
But with price maintenance it become much more difficult 
in decldii% on the best buy* It beccmies difficult to deter­
mine which retailer offers the greatest advantage in services 
such as credit, free deliveries, after sale semice to mention 
a few. Retailers will undoubtedly advertise the advantages of 
their services but the similarity of claims end the vagueness 
of differences will hacker customers* decisions. Personal 
visits to enable close examination may supply more information 
but the customer will still not be able to gauge in terms of 
money which offers the greatest value*
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Resale price maintenance prevents the retailer from 
selecting his own individual ccKBhination of price,sservice 
and sales promotion* As a result the conswaers liberty of 
choice between patronising a store with low prices and a mini­
mum amount of service and sales effort or patronising another 
outlet with higher prices and more impressive service is re­
moved or limited,
% a t  seme of the additional service resultix^ from resale 
price maintenance is of value to the oonsimer Is indisputable. 
But the relevant point is that some consumers would prefer 
lower prices over better or increased service.4 Resale price 
maintenance forces them to pay for service they would rather
4 "Many shoppers are helped by suitably trained and expe­
rienced sales staff and by being able to chose from a wide 
range of goods. Helpful amS ctmqpetent staff and wide and 
varied stocks are costly. These costs can be largely avoided 
by retailers who let the goods sell themselves and vdxo limit 
their stocks to a narrow range of items which are best sellers. 
It would be ideal if the two types of shop could flourish side- 
by-slde, the proportions to be settled by the preferences of 
shoppers. It is conceivable, however, that the two types of 
shop could not co-exist so long as they are able to charge 
different prices f w  the Sftae goods. It is arguable that some 
shoppers may make use of the excellent services and selections
in a shop of the first type, and decide what they want to buy. 
They may then go to a shop of the second type and buy the items 
they want.... Thus they eanbuy at the lower prices, after 
availing themselves (without cost to themselves) of the expen­
sive services of the first shop. It follows that shops of the 
first type would tend to go out of b u s i n e s s . T h e  consumers 
would be worse off;..." B. S. Yamey, Resale Price Maintenance 
and Shopper's Choice (London, 1964) p. 20, Althou^ Yamey pre­
sents the soundest counter-argument to this point we could dis­
cover, he is not convinced of its validity.
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do wlthmt. îtoreover as the consumers who would most prefer 
lower prices to additional service are to be found principally 
in the lower-ineome groups, resale price maintenance may be 
said to discriminate more particularly against this groi^.
The sensational suooess of the cash amd carry discount 
store in both the United States and Canada has illustrated 
that a large groip of consumers from all classes are prepared 
to forego extensive retail services or to break established 
habits of ahos^ing under the stimulus of price reductions*
B, S« Ymey is asseaaing the effect of resale price main­
tenance in t^e United Kingdom writes:
The denial to cwsumera of the effective choice 
between more elaborate and less elaborate services 
has IrAlbited the development of retailing methods 
which provide goods cheaply but with austere service...^
• In the short run resale price maintenance will prevent 
the competitive retailer from reaching his most efficient level 
of operation* In the long run resale price maintenance will 
hinder the developnent of econmles of scale in retailing*^
The short %%n objective can be obtained by increasing 
the turnover of stock to its most efficient point. The long 
run objective will be attained by increasing both the volume
5 B. 8* Yamey, The Soonaoics of Resale Price Maintenance 
(London,1954) p* 74.
6 See I>. A* Skeoch, "The Abolition of Resale Price Main­
tenance: S«R@ Notes on Canadian Si^rience" Sconmica. Au^at 
1964, pp. 268-9.
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of stock and the rate of turnover to their most efficient 
points. Both objectives require expansion of the retailers 
sales, differing only In the degree of eaqpanslon. This can 
only be obtained by either stimulating demand In his segment 
of the market or by extending his spatial market or more like­
ly by a combination of both.
The effective method of accomplishing this Is by offering 
lower prices. The more substantial the reductions a retailer 
can offer the greater will be the area from which he can at­
tract customers. To the consumer the saving must warrant the 
additional time and travel involved plus the inconvenience in 
changing shopping habits.
Soren Oammelgaard in commenting on this aspect writes:
Mail order houses, chain stores, department 
stores, consumer co-operatives, super markets, 
voluntary chains, self-service shops, dlsowbt 
houses, and other new types of trading establish­
ments have made their way to a large extent by 
selling more oheaply than ordinal^ shops, and they 
have generally been against resale price mainten­
ance, at least during their formative years. The 
fact that those forms are, as a rule, less de­
veloped in Western Europe than in the United States 
ffl€Cr have several causes, but the greater extent 
of resale price maintenance In Europe may be one 
of them.7
The uniform and inflexible price structure resulting from 
resale price maintenance prevents distributors from seeking
7 Soren Gammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris, 
1958), p. 66.
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out more efficient distribution methods. Besides being denied 
his own individual choice of price and service to be offered 
the consumer, the distributor is prevented from changing or 
differentiating his prices in such a way so as to influence 
customers "to make purchases at those times, in those quan­
tities and packages, and on those terms of delivery which in­
cur the lowest costs for both parties”.^
Resale price maintenance tends then to hamper both the 
development of more efficient retailing methods and the ex­
pansion of the existing eff&cient outlets by removing the most 
effective tool, price competition.
When a program of resale price maintenance is instigated 
and more particularly when the initiative has come from re­
tailers there will be a strong tendency to establish high mar­
gins. As the manufacturer will desire to obtain the widest 
possible distribution for his product it is extremely likely 
that he will fix margins at a level to allow a profit to high 
cost retailers.
The ccxabination of potential high profits plus security 
from price competition will tend to attract new entries into 
the branches of retailing with general price maintenance. This 
will tend to reinforce the tendency to "excess capacity" which
8 Ibid.a p. 67.
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prevails In retailing as a consequence of the ease of entry.
Thus resale price maintenance contributes in two ways 
to the inefficient use of resources In retailing. First by 
diverting coo^etitive energies from price coi^etitlon into 
advertising and service competition it leads to undesired 
use of resources. Secondly, by attracting new retailers to 
the scene it reinforces the tendency to "excess capacity" and 
the resulting inefficient use of resources.
Competitive retailers may try to counteract the limita­
tions on price competition imposed by resale price maintenance 
by introducing their own brands. But the products which are 
price maintained are usually produced by well established 
firms who have built up strong consumer preference. This 
fact may make it a lengthy and costly procedure to establish 
acceptance and push the sale of a private brand. Even where 
this is done successfully the effect of price competition Is 
lessened because of the difficulty faced by consumers in 
assessing whether the difference in price reflects a 'better 
buy* or a variation in quality. The price level of the price 
maintained brand will in the same vein influence the pidcing 
of the private brand.
While retailers have been far more active than wholesalers 
in persuading manufacturers to adopt resale price maintenance, 
wholesalers have generally actively supported the retailers
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In their demands.9
The "Wholesalers motive is similar to that of the retailer, 
the protection of profits and possible higher profits. In 
addition, the survival of the smaller independent retailer la 
imperative to the continued existence of the wholesaler.
The growth of large retail organizations to the point 
where their bargaining power enables them to buy direct from 
the manufacturer threatens the very function of the wholesaler 
while exerting pressures on his price structure. Consequently 
wholersalers will be influenced to join forces with retailers 
in demanding resale price maintenance in order to hanper the 
development of economic power among the larger retailers.
The effects of resale price maintenance on the function 
of wholesaling will be similar to that on retailing. Competi­
tive forces will be diverted from price competition to compe­
tition in services. The development of more efficient methods 
will be retarded and there will be a tendency for new entries 
to be attracted into the field because of higher margins and 
security from price competition.
Resale price maintenance increases distribution costa 
initiially and subsequently Impedes the development of coat re­
ducing methods. By removing the spur of price competition it
9 See V, A, Mund, Government and Business. (New York,
1955), P. 464.
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slows down the pace of change in the distribution system.
The greater the difference in trading methods 
in use at any one time, the greater the importance 
which must be attached to a speedy replacement of 
less efficient firms and methods by more efficient 
ones, and the greater become the retarding effects 
of resale price maintenance.10
Besides restricting the efforts of the competitive ele­
ment of the distribution system resale price maintenance 
penalizes the consumer. Not only is the consumer required 
to pay higher prices he is given no voice in deciding the 
amount of distributive costs he may wish to pay.
The retailer is restricted on one hand from offering a 
choice of alternatives between services and price and on the 
other the consumer is restricted from making his choice and 
thus influencing changes in the structure of retailing.
10 Soren Gammelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance. (Paris 
1958), p. 67.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VI
m Y  HAHUPACqgRERS MAY DESIRE 
RESALE PRICE HAINTSNANCE
In the early history of resale price maintenance it was 
the small traditional retailer who advocated and can^aigned 
for the adoption of the practice while manufacturers were some, 
what reluctant to act. More recently, particularly since the 
end of World War II, it has been the manufacturer who has made 
greater efforts to establish programs of resale price mainten­
ance and who has been its most active supporter. An excellent 
example has been the efforts of electrical appliance manufac­
turers in both the United States^ and Canada^.
In determining the motives which may induce manufacturers 
to advocate resale price maintenance it has already been in­
dicated that the desire of dealers and their association for 
its adoption may be sufficient reason for the manufacturer, 
as their eaiviest support la obviously to his benefit. But 
all retailers are not normally in favour of resale price main­
tenance so the manufacturer will lose some support whatever
1 See Stewart Munro Lee, "Problems of Resale Price Main* 
tenance". Journal of Marketing XXIII. (January, 1959) pp.
280.
2 See Report on an Inquiry into Loss-Leader Sellingj Re« 
strictive Trade Practices Commission (Ottawa, 1955) p. 225.
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course he adopts.
On first examination, resale price maintenance would 
appear to be against the interests of the manufacturer. The 
objective of the practice is to set the price at a minimum or 
fixed level. Once the factory price is established it would 
be assumed that the manufacturer would generally desire to 
have his product resold at as low a price as possible so that 
the largest possible number of consumers could afford to pur­
chase the product. The smaller the resale margin, the larger 
- other things being equal - the profits of the manufacturer 
as his sales increase.
But price is not the only factor affecting the consumer’s 
decision, particularly when there is a difficult c(xqparison 
between a diversity of brands carxving various prices. % e  
manufacturer may find it more beneficial to Invest in sales 
promotion and sell at somewhat higher prices. The sales pro­
motion may involve the use of advertising in an effort to try 
and persuade the consumer in advance to ask for his brand or 
it may involve an attempt to influence the consumer at the 
very moment of purchase, or more likely, a combination of 
both, Ttie effective method of influencing the consumer at the 
moment of purchase is to supply retailers with an incentive 
to make a special sales effort in favour of the manufacturer’s 
brand. Resale price maintenance may appear as an aid to the
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manufacturer In making both types of sales promotion effective, 
but particularly the latter.
% e  tendency then will be to set the margin high in order 
to ensure stocking of the product by even the high cost re­
tailer and also to supply a strong incentive for preferential 
treatment of the product by retailers.
The manufacturer who adopts a resale price will certainly 
still be guided by rational motives in his selection. The 
price will be selected on the basis that it will likely give 
the manufacturer the maximum profit in the long term.
But a manufacturer will not be inclined to adopt the 
practice unless it is likely his competitors will do the same. 
If heshould adopt resale price maintenance while his competi­
tors do not his product becomes extremely vulnerable to price 
competition at the retail level with the iB^lications for his 
share of the maMcet.
In a trade where the sellers are kept fully 
and promptly informed about the price-decisions 
of their rivals, it may hs^pen, as has been seen, 
that price-fluctuations will be damped down be­
cause of prudent individual calculation and with­
out collusion. In a prlce-leadership situation
this result occurs not because of the mutual can­
niness of theimore-or-lesB equal competitors but 
because one seller has a predominant position, 
which others, if they are prudent, will not see 
fit to challenge.3
3 A, D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the United States 
of America. (London, i960) p. 53.
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If the manufacturer is the dominant firm in the industry 
and particularly if he has attained some cost advantages he 
may be in a position to adopt resale price maintenance with 
the result that other firms in the industry follow his lead.
In an industry where competitors are relatively equal in 
power and resources the desire to adopt reaale price mainten­
ance must usually be industry wide. Even though the incentive 
may come from strong retail organizations some agreement, tacit 
or formal, is highly likely between manufacturers prior to 
its adoption.
Although resale price maintenance is first and 
foremost a method of abolishing price competition 
among dealers it can also be a means of abolishing 
or restricting oox^titlon among the producers 
themselves and this may sometimes be the manufac­
turer’s chief motive in adopting the system.*
Resale price maintenance tends to find support in indus­
tries where there are relatively few companies, large in size, 
producing well established products. With the combination of 
resale price maintenance on an industry wide basis and rela­
tively few but large manufacturers, retail prices will tend 
to settle at a ccxtsnon level either through agreement or price 
leadership.
Price competition having been eliminated at the retail 
level it has been argued that price competition will take place
4 Soren A, Gananelgaard, Resale Price Maintenance, (Paris, 
1958) p.42.
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at the manufacturers' level. In other words the individual 
manufacturer will tend to compete by offering a larger margin 
on his product thus leading the retailer to promote his brand 
more aggressively than a ccH^etltor’s brand.5
But If one manufacturer increases his margin this can 
only result in pressure by retailers on the remaining manufac­
turers in the industry to match or surpass the increase. The 
net result would tend to be a decreased return to all manufac­
turers because of the increased margins.
% e  action of wholesalers will follow a similar pattern.
As a result of the pressure from distributors or of fore­
seeing the possibility of this pressure, the self interest of 
the manufacturers through agreement or price leadership will 
lead to uniformity of margins at the wholesale and retail level 
with the resulting uniformity in factory prices* With price 
competition eliminated at all levels, the division of the mar­
ket among the brands is left to depend upon such factors as 
the reputation of different brands and the success of sales 
promotion efforts.
The desire for resale price maintenance by an industry 
may be the result of a horizontal agreement among manufacturers.
3 Manufacturers may argue that margins will tend to be 
reduced because of price competition at the retail level when 
prices are established. Supra, pp. 69*70 for rebuttal.
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Price competition at the retail level would tend to disrupt 
the complete plan and make it unwo^able.
Another motive may be compensating protection for both 
manufacturers and retailers. Manufacturers protect dealers 
from price ocmipetltion by establishing a program of resale 
price maintenance. ‘Hie retailers, in return protect the manu­
facturers through tacit agreement to purchase only from them 
and not to buy from manufacturars without maintained prices. 
% i s  affords the manufacturer protection particularly from 
new entries into the industry and those using competitive 
selling methods.
The manufacturer may see in resale price maintenance a 
method of keeping a favourable bargaining position. Under the 
system it is the manufacturer who sets the price and; margins 
for his product, ensuring demand by use of advertising and 
other sales promotion methods. With his product distributed 
through a large number of outlets, small and large, and a sub­
stantial margin, he enjoys relative freedom from pressure by 
retailers for prloe concessions, more particularly if agreement 
or price leadership exists in the industry.
Without resale price maintenance, price coo^etltlon among 
retailers will lead to constant pressure on their margins which, 
sooner or later, will result in pressure on the manufacturer’s 
prices and margins also. Since price competition is likely to
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favour some of the larger and more aggreasive retailers their 
bargaining strength will increase with their sales.
The development tends to follow closely that outlined 
by J. K. Galbraith in his "Theory of Countervailing Power",^ 
Industries desiring resale price maintenance tend to have 
characteristics of a few large sellers protected by difficulty 
of entry and having accepted a convention against price com­
petition. "Power on one side of a market creates both the 
need for, and the prospect of reward to, the exercise of coun­
tervailing power from the other side."^
Where no resale price maintenance exists, the large re­
tailer may by aggressive price competition along with improved 
merchandising methods obtain a substantial segment of the re­
tail market for a product. In the case of a chain store or a 
department store, the share attained might be an important 
portion of the individual manufacturer's production.
By threatening to buy elsewhere or to enter the manufac­
turing field the retailer may be able to gain substantial price 
concessions from the manufacturer who wishes to protect an 
efficient production schedule.
The purpose of adopting resale price maintenance may be 
designed to forestall or prevent such development of economic
6 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism. (Boston
1956) pp. 108-34,
7 Ibid.. p. 113.
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power by retailing organizations. Through Its use the manu­
facturer is able to obtain wide distribution through many out­
lets thus preventing or hindering the concentration of retail 
sales with the large retailers.
Resale price maintenance may actually be more effective
Q
in controlling the lax%e retailer than his small competitor.
Small distributora generally can get awsqr with 
a fair amount of price cutting, but large distributors 
are under careful surveillance by the manufacturers 
and rival f^tailers. Thus resale price maintenance 
tends to favour the small distributor in two ways: 
he cannot be undercut by the large distributor, and 
he is left considerable rocxa in which to undercut 
the large distributor.9
The manufacturers motive for desiring resale price main­
tenance must be either to obtain an Increased profit or to 
protect the present level of profits. It would appear that he 
is afforded the opportunity to do a little of both.
If there is a tendency to a horizontal agreement or price 
leadership in the Industry, a price approaching the monopoly 
level may be placed on the product with efforts directed at 
establishing it as acceptable through constant advertising 
associating the price with high quality.
There may be some tendency to a waste of resources as a
8 See S, R. Corey "Pair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal", 
Harvard Business Review XXX. (September, 1952).
9 Alfred R. Oxenfeldt, Industrial Pricing and Market 
Prices. (New York, 1951) p. 429,
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result of the legal and other costs of policing and enforcing 
a system of resale price maintenance,^^ Constant policing 
will be required if the system is to be effective and where 
violations are encountered legal costs will be incurred on 
both sides.
Finally, with the bargaining power of the large retailer 
effectively checked and where the spur of price competition is 
not effective the Incentive to pass on any cost savings result­
ing from technological advancement or increased l^olume to the 
consumer is very limited. Such economies are likely to result 
in the increased allocation of resources to sales promotion 
efforts with the objective of increasing the market share.
10 See Stewart Munro Lee, "Problems of Resale Price Main­
tenance". Journal of Marketing XXIII (Januaiy, 1959) pp. 274- 
280.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this discussion has been to attespt to 
establish whether resale price maintenance does or does not 
serve the public interest. In assessing the practice the two 
major considerations have been the implications for the con­
sumer and for the efficiency of the economic system.^
The history of the origins of resale price maintenance 
indicate a similarity in early development in the United King­
dom, the United States and Canada. The threat of new types of 
retail outlets to the position of the small traditional retail­
er forced him to seek methods of counteracting this competition, 
Department and chain stores were cutting into the trade 
of the small retailer through price c^xipetition. The increase 
of branded and trade-maz^ced merchandise contributed to further 
competition across product lines. As a means of improving 
their competitive position small retailers joined together to 
f o m  trade associations which proceeded to negotiate with 
manufacturers and to persuade some to adopt resale prloe
1 Within the limitations and qualifications regarding 
restrictions on competition and price ccmtpetition mentioned 
above. Supra., p. 4,
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maintenance.
In the United Kingdom the practice became fairly wide­
spread, having been estimated to aaount to thirty percent of 
the public’s expenditure on consumer goods in 1938.2 There 
was no legislation dealing with resale price maintenance until 
1956 when horizontal resale price agreements were ruled illegal. 
Individual resale price maintenance was finally prohib­
ited with the passing of "Tho Resales Prices Act" in 1964. 
Suppliers of goods were allowed to apply for exemption from 
the statutory proî?lbition with the provision that resale price 
maintenance could be continued until the ccwrt rendered a 
decision, A substantial number of applications were submitted 
and despite the fact that an increasing number of applications 
are being withdrawn it appears it may be several years before 
the Court renders decisions on the many applications remalnlng.3 
In the United States the period prior to the 1930‘s was 
notable for the uncertainity of the legal position of resale 
price maintenance. The practice was first made legal for 
intrastate commerce in California in 1931, % e  passage of the 
Miller-Tydinga Act in 1937 legalized resale price maintenance 
in interstate commerce where commodities were shipped into
2 See Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance 
(Lloyd Jacob Report) (London, 1949) p. Î,
3 See the Economist July 3# 1965, p. 58,
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states where it was legal under state law. Within two years 
the number of states with "Fair Trade" laws increased from 
fourteen to forty-five.
Tirte Sohuegmann decision in 1951 invalidating the Con­
signer'' clause caused a collapse of resale price maintenance 
in interstate trade and severe price coa^etition developed.
The McGuire Act of the next year restored the "non-signer" 
clause but the reprieve for the practice was only temporary.
The increasing abundance of goods and the resulting sharp­
ening of competition contributed to increasing violation of 
resale price maintenance. The evolution of the large discount 
store offering a wide variety of merchandise on a cash and 
carry basis was a major factor in the increasing ccmipetition.
The large discount stores in order to develop the require) 
market out prices substantially on a large cross section of 
merchandise involving also price maintained articles. This 
coupled with price cutting by some smsCLl retailers on price 
maintained goods forced the large chains and department stores 
to put constant pressure on manufacturers to discipline the 
price cutters. The resulting heavily increased costs of 
policing resale price maintenance agreements ultimately induced 
a large number of manufacturers to abandon the practice. Al­
though some resale price maintenance still exists in the United 
States the practice does not appear to be significant in
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distribution policies.
In Canada, resale price maintenance attracted little 
attention or comment prior to World War II although in two in­
vestigations it was found that it was detrimental to public 
interest. The uncertainity of the legal position of resale 
price maintenance during this period may account for the in­
frequent reference to the practice.
Following World War II the use of resale price maintenance 
increased leading to the investigation of the MacQuarrie Com­
mittee. As a result, in December, 1931, the practice, and any 
attempt to enforce it, were made illegal. In I960 an amendment 
was passed which allows a manufacturer to refuse to sell to 
anyone who uses his product as a loss-leader, which is defined 
as selling the article not for the purpose of making a profit 
but for the purpose of advertising or of attracting customers 
to his store. Sales may also be withheld if the dealer is 
making a practice of engaging in misleading advertising in 
respect of the product or failing to provide the level of ser­
vicing that purchasers might reasonably expect.
This amendment tends to weaken the legislation as manu­
facturers appear to be now in a position to exert some pressure 
on retailers in an effort to establish a minimum retail price. 
Although designed to eliminate the "loss-leader" complaint it 
does not appear to have been sufficient in view of the Canadian
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Appliance Manufacturers Association*a plan to present a brief 
to the government later this year requesting "some pricing 
control".*
Although developments in all three countries have followed 
somewhat different paths, the apparent destinations appear to 
be the same, the eventual elimination of resale price mainten­
ance. Can«3a, as a result of a recommendation from an investi­
gation into increasing prices,5 conducted a public inquiry into 
the practice leading to its banning In 1951. Tho United King­
dom legislation of 1964 similarly resulted from public enquir­
ies into the use of the practice. The gradual abandonment of 
its use in the United States appears to have been caused in 
part by the increasing aggressiveness of both new and old re­
tailers^ and in part by the differences and inconsistencies of 
Federal and State Legislation.
Resale price maintenance originated with the small retail­
ers* efforts to gain protection from the price competition of 
new types of retail outlets. This has continued to be the 
prime motive of that segment of the retailing industry which
4 See "Some Pricing Control Will be Requested by Appliance 
Manufacturers". The Globe and Mail. August 6, 1965, p. Bl,
5 See Report of Royal Commission on Price. I, (Ottawa, 
1949), p. 41.
6 See L, A. Skeoch, "The Abolition of Resale Price Main­
tenance: Some Notes on Canadian Experience", Economics, August 
1964, p. 269.
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has continued to support the practice.
Resale price maintenance also may afford retailers a meam 
of obtaining a horizontal price-fixing agreement where manufac­
turers are willing or can be persuaded to require that their 
product be sold by all retailers at the same price. It is actu­
ally more effective than a horizontal agreement among retailers 
because of the ability of the manufacturer to take action 
against violators of the agreement.
The practice tends to restrict competition at the retail 
level with its implications for the consumer and for the use 
of resources. Its effects upon the structure of retailing tend 
to be retardative in nature,
Resale price maintenance protects the non-aggressive re­
tailer, particularly the inefficient and marginal iterator, and 
increases the costs of distribution by the tendency to increase 
service costs, to increase excess capacity in retailing and to 
hamper the evolution of more efficient retailing methods and 
economies of scale in retailing establishments.
With price competition prevented or limited by the practice, 
competitive energies are directed Into advertising and service 
channels with a resulting increase to retailing costs. Easy ored> 
it, free delivery, elaborate store furnishings, costly displays 
are all used in varying degrees in an effort to stimulate buying. 
The high margins resulting from the manufacturers’ need
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to provide a profit to high coat retailers, with their sugges­
tion of an opportunity to earn better than average profits 
will tend to draw new entries into retailing. This will re­
inforce the tendency of the retail industry to develop "excess 
capacity" as a result of ease of entry.
The elimination of price competition removes the major 
incentive to the development of less costly retailing methods. 
The retailer is prevented from using any savings effected by 
moT*e efficient methods to reduce prices with the view of ex­
panding his sales in an effort to gain further reductions of 
costs. He is precluded from varying his margins in an effort 
to find the turnover which produces the maximum profit. By 
losing the use of price competition both to stimulate demand 
and to extend his spatial market the retailer is hampered in 
attaining economies of scale over the long run.
The growth of economic power in the retailing field should 
not be a concern unless it is likely to result in a tendency 
to monopoly. The present trends in retailing do not indicate 
any such tendency in view of the continued survival of the 
small retailer and the keen competition between the various 
types of retailing.?
7 See John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism. (Boston 
1956), p. 118 for a discussion of the position of the large 
retailer.
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The threat from economic power in retailing to the manu­
facturers' margins undoubtedly supplied one of the motives for 
manufacturers* strong support of resale price maintenance in 
recent years. Resale price maintenance assists manufacturers 
in retaining the major role in the setting of prices by two 
Influences. On one hand the practice hampers the development 
of economic power in retailing by retarding market expansion 
by the retailer. On the other hand it tends to counteract the 
impact of economic power in retailing by ensuring the manufac­
turer the use of a relatively large and possibly, excessively 
large number of outlets. This enables the manufacturer to 
better resist pressure from the large retailers.
Resale price maintenance also may enable manufacturers to 
eliminate pressures on their margins from another source. Where 
resale price maintenance is introduced Into an industry it will 
tend to be adopted industry wide. If the practice is to persist 
a common retail price level will likely result prompting uni­
formity in retail and wholesale maxrgins and the resulting sim­
ilarity in factory prices.
Conversely, where a horizontal agreement exists between 
manufacturers, resale price maintenance supplies a natural sup­
plement to the arrangement. It prevents retail price competi­
tion and its disturbing effects upon both msirket shares and 
manufacturers* faith In their competitors* adherence to the
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horizontal agreement.
Resale price maintenance could be the main basis for 
agreements between manufacturers and retailers for their mu­
tual protection. The manufacturers implementation of price 
maintenance protects the retailers from price competition.
In exchange retailers tacitly agree to buy only from the manu­
facturers concerned and not to buy from manufacturers without 
a resale price maintenance policy. The manufacturer receives 
some protection from both new entries Into the industry and 
those manufacturers using more competitive selling methods.
It would appear that resale price maintenance offers manu­
facturers an opportunity to prevent pressure on their margins 
from two possible sources. By both impeding and providing a 
possible defense against economic power in retailing the prac­
tice limits the pressure from the other aide of the market, 
the retailers, on manufacturers' profit margins. Either as a 
means to or a supplement to horizontal agreements resale price 
maintenance can be used as a means of preventing pressure on 
manufacturers' margins through price competition at the facto# 
level.
The manufacturers’ requests for protection frmm the so- 
called "loss-leader" practice are attempts designed toward ob­
taining some type of price control at the retail level. The 
inability to arrive at a clear cut definition of a "loss-leader"
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plus the lack of proof thatt manufaoturers » aalea are In any 
way detrimentally affected by loss-leader competition tends 
to lead to a rejection of the argument. Any legislation 
designed to control loss-leadess, such as the Canadian Amend­
ment of I960, will tend to create a situation in which manu­
facturers will be able to influence minimum resale prices.
Any benefits claimed for the consumer from the practice 
have failed to be substantiated. The consumer is actually 
penalised in several ways. He is forced to pay a higher price 
than he might otherwise have to pay if price competition were 
present because of the resulting higher margins at both the 
retail and wholesale level plus the possibility of excessive 
margins at the manufacturing level. In addition the consumer 
la made to pay for services that he may not desire. He is 
denied the choice of a corresponding reduction in price in 
lieu of the services. The very denial of this choice severely 
restricts the consumers* influence on the distribution system 
and hence the development of more efficient methods of distri­
bution with their Implication for lower prices.
The inefficient use of resources may occur in both distri­
bution and manufacturing as a result of resale price maintenance.
At both the retail and wholesale level the elimination of 
price competition will tend to result In the greater absorption 
of resources into services. The higher guaranteed margins
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will attract new fima Involving unneeded resources Into areas 
which already have a tendency to excess capacity. While pro­
viding protection for the high coat marginal operator the prac­
tice at the same time will hai^er the development of the more 
efficient use of resources in distribution. The net result 
is to draw a greater portion of the national resources into 
distribution than would be necessary under price competition.
At the manufacturing level resale price maintenance may 
result in or perform as an aid to a non-competitive price 
structure. Competitive energies of manufacturers will then 
tend to be diverted to advertising and sales prcxmotion on a 
larger scale than under price coo^etltlon. This coupled with 
the cost of policing resale price maintenance will tend to 
increase manufacturers' costs. In addition any decreases In 
production costs resulting fraa technological improvement or 
increased volume are likely to be used for greater sales pro­
motion as opposed to being passed on as price reductions as 
might be the case under price competition.
Resale price maintenance sqipears to be a restrictive prac­
tice which does not serve the public interest. By contributing 
to non-ooi^etitive price structures at all levels it tends to 
divert competitive efforts to increased and excessive distri­
bution services with the resulting Inefficient use of resources. 
By eliminating price compétition it retards the development of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
more efficient methods of distribution with their implications 
for lower prices.
Resale price maintenance through higher prices forces 
the consumer to assume the burden of higher distribution costs, 
to subsidize inefficient distributors and to contribute to 
higher profits of manufacturers.
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APPENDIX
THE COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT 
Part V. Sections 33 and 34
33. Every person who is a party or privy to or kn<M#lngly 
assists in, or In the formation of, a merger or monopoly la 
guilty of an Indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment 
for two years.
Merger and monopoly are defined in Subsection 2(e) and 2(f)
respectively of the Act as follows:
"merger” means the acquisition by one or more persons, 
whether by purchase or lease of shares or assets or 
otherwise, of any control over or^lnterest in the 
whole or part of the business of a competitor, sup­
plier, customer or any other trade person, whereby 
competition
(i) in a trade or industry,
(ii) among the sources of supply of a trade or 
industry
(ill) among the outlets for sales of a trade or 
Industry, or
(iv) otherwise than in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and 
(ill).
is or is likely to be lessened to the detriment or 
against the Interest of the public, whether consumers, 
producers or others;
"monopoly" means a situation where one or more per­
sons either substantially or completely control 
throughout Canada or (my area thereof the class or 
species of business in which they are engaged and 
have operated such business or are likely to operate 
it to the detriment or against the interest of the 
public, whether consumers, producers or others, but 
a situation shall not be deemed a monopoly within 
the meaning of this paragraph by reason only of the
89
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the exercise of any right or enjoyment of any inter­
est derived under the Patent Act, or any other Act 
of the Parliament of Canada - Editors)
33A. (1) Every one engaged in a business who
(a) is a party or privy to, or assists in, any sale that 
discriminates to his knowledge, directly or indirect­
ly, against competitors of a purchaser of articles 
from him in that any discount, rebate, allowance, 
price concession or other advantage is granted to the 
purchaser over and above any discount, rebate, allow­
ance, price concession or other advantage that, at 
the time the articles are sold to such purchaser,
is available to such competitors in respect of a 
sale of articles of like quality and quantity;
(b) engages in a policy of selling articles in any area 
of Canada at prices lower than those exacted by him 
elsewhere in Canada, having the effect or tendency 
of substantially lessening competition or elimina­
ting a competitor in such part of Canada, or de­
signed to have such effect; or
(c) engages in a policy of selling articles at prices 
unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of 
substantially lessening competition or eliminating 
a competitor, or designed to have such effect.
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprison­
ment for two years.
(2) It is not an offence under paragraph (a) subsection
(1) to be a party or privy to, or assist in any sale mentioned 
therein unless the discount, rebate, allowance, price conces­
sion or other advantage was granted as part of a practice of 
discriminating as described in that paragraph.
(3) ihe provisions of paragraph (a) of aubeection (I) 
shall not be construed to prohibit a co-operative society from 
returning to producers or consumers, or a co-operative whole­
sale society from returning to its constituent retail or whole­
sale members, the whole or any part of the net surplus made in 
its trading operations in proportion to purchases made from or 
sales made to the society.*
* Section 33A of the Combines Investigation Act was Section 
412 of the Criminal Code prior to the I960 amendment to the Act
- Editors.
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33B. (1) In this section "allowance" means any discount, re­
bate, price concession or other advantage that is or purports 
to be offered or granted for advertising or display purposes 
and is collateral to a sale or sales of articles but is not 
applied directly to the selling price.
(2) Every one engaged in a business who is a party or 
privy to the granting of an allowance to any purchaser that 
is not offered on proportionate terms to other purchasers in 
competition with the first-mentioned purchaser (which other 
purchasers are in this section called "competing purchasers"), 
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprison­
ment for two years.
(3) For the purposes of this section, an allowance is 
offered on proportionate terms only if
(a) the allowance offered to a purchaser is in 
approximately the same proportion to the 
value of sales to him as the allowance of­
fered to each competing purchaser is to the 
total value of sales to such coi^eting pur­
chaser,
(b) in any case where advertising or other ex­
penditures or services are exacted in return 
therefor, the cost therof requiz>ed to be 
incurred by a purchaser is in approximately 
the same proportion to the value of sales to 
him as the cost of such advertising or other 
expenditures or services required to be in­
curred by each competing purchaser Is to the 
total value of sales to such competing pur­
chaser, and
(c) in any case where services are exacted in 
return therfor, the requirements thereof 
have regard to the kinds of services that 
competing purchasers at the same or differ­
ent levels of distribution are ordinarily 
able to perform or cause to be performed.
33C. (1) Every one who, for the purpose of piwmoting the sale 
or use of an article, makes any materially misleading repre­
sentation to the public, by any means whatever, concerning the 
price at which such or like articles have been, are or will be, 
ordinarily sold, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary 
conviction.
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(2) Subsection (I) does not apply to a person who pub­
lishes an advertisement that he accepts in good faith for 
publication in the ordinary course of his business.
34. (1) In this section "dealer" means a person engaged in the 
business of manufacturing or supplying or selling any article 
or ccKnmodity.
(2) No dealer shall directly or indirectly by agreement, 
threat, promise or any other means whatsoever, require or 
induce or atteogpt to require or induce any other person to re­
sell an article or commodity
(a) at a price specified by the dealer or established 
by agreement,
(b) at a price not less than a minimum price specified 
by the dealer or established by agreement,
(c) at a markup or discount specified by the dealer or 
established by agreement,
(d) at a markup not less than a minimum markup specified 
by the dealer or established by agreement, or
(e) at a discount not greater than a maximum discount 
specified by the dealer or established by agreement,
whether such maztoip or discount or minimum markup or 
maximum discount is esqpressed as a percentage or other­
wise.
(3) No dealer shall refuse to sell or supply an article or 
commodity to any other person for the reason thatzrsuch other 
person
(a) has reused to resell or to offer for resale the art­
icle or coBwodity
(i) at a price specified by the dealer or estab­
lished by agreement,
(ii) at a price not leas than a minimum price 
specified by the dealer or established by 
agreement,
(ill) at a markup or discount specified by the 
dealer or established by agreement,
(iv) at a markup not less than a minimum markup 
specified by the dealer or established by 
agreement, or
(v) at a discount not greater than a maximum 
discount specified by the dealer or estab­
lished by agreement3 or
(b) has resold or offered to resell the article or 
commodity
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(1) at a price less than a price or minimum price 
specified by the dealer or established by 
agreement,
(ii) at a markup less than a markup or minimum
mazicup specified by the dealer or established 
by agre«nent, or
(ill) at a discount greater than a discount or maxi­
mum discount specified by the dealer or estab­
lished by agreement.
(4) Eveiy person who violates subsection (2) or (3) is 
guilty of an indictable offence and is liable on conviction to 
a fine in the discretion of the court or to Imprisonment for
a term not exceeding two years or to both, 1951 (2nd Sess.), 
o. 30, s. 1; 1952, c. 39# ». 4.
(5) Where# in a prosecution under this section# It is 
proved that the person charged refused or counselled the re­
fusal to sell or supply an article to any other person# no 
inference unfavourable to the person charged shall be drawn 
from such evidence if he satisfies the court that he and any 
one upon whose %'eport he depended had reasonable cause to 
believe and did believe
(a) that the other person was making a practice of 
using articles supplied by the person charged 
as loss-leaders# that is to say# not for the 
purpose of making a profit thereon but for pur­
poses of advertisings
(b) that the other person was making a practice of 
using articles supplied by the person charged 
not for the purpose of selling such articles at 
a profit but for the purpose of attracting cus- 
tCHners to his store in the hope of selling them 
other articles;
(c) that the other person was making a practice of 
engaging in misleading advertising in respect 
of articles supplied by the person charged; or
(d) that the other person made a practice of not 
providing the level of servicing that purchasers 
of such articles might reasonably expect from 
such other person.
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